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ABSTRACT
Given the substantial and growxing scientific literature on implicit bias, the time has now
come to confront a critical question: What, {anything, should we do about implicit bias in
the courtroom? The author team comprises legal academics, scientists, researchers, and even
a sitting federal judge who seek to answer this question in accordance with behavioral
realism. The Article first provides a succinct scientific introduction to implicit bias, with
some important theoretical clarifications that distinguish betwx een explicit, implicit,
and structural forms of bias. Next, the Article applies the science to two trajectories of
bias relevant to the courtroom. One story follows a criminal defendant path; the other
story folloxvs a cixil employment discrimination path. This application involves not only a
focused scientific reviexw but also a step-by-step examination of hoxv criminal and civil trials
proceed. Finally, the Article examines various concrete intervention strategies to counter
implicit biases for key players in the justice system, such as the judge and jury.
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INTRODUCTION
The problems of overt discrimination have received enormous attention
from lawyers, judges, academics, and policymakers. While explicit sexism, racism,
and other forms of bias persist, they have become less prominent and public over
the past century. But explicit bias and overt discrimination are only part of the
problem. Also important, and likely more pervasive, are questions surrounding
implicit bias-attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, decisionmaking, and behavior, without our even realizing it.
How prevalent and significant are these implicit, unintentional biases? To
answer these questions, people have historically relied on their gut instincts and
personal experiences, which did not produce much consensus. Over the past two
decades, however, social cognitive psychologists have discovered novel ways to measure the existence and impact of implicit biases-without relying on mere common
sense. Using experimental methods in laboratory and field studies, researchers
have provided convincing evidence that implicit biases exist, are pervasive, are
large in magnitude, and have real-world effects. These fascinating discoveries,
which have migrated from the science journals into the law reviews and even popular
discourse, are now reshaping the law's fundamental understandings of discrimination and fairness.
Given the substantial and growing scientific literature on implicit bias, the
time has now come to confront a critical question: What, ifanything, should we do
about implicit bias in the courtroom? In other words, how concerned should we be
that judges, advocates, litigants, and jurors come to the table with implicit biases
that influence how they interpret evidence, understand facts, parse legal principles, and make judgment calls? In what circumstances are these risks most acute?
Are there practical ways to reduce the effects of implicit biases? To what extent can
awareness of these biases mitigate their impact? What other debiasing strategies
might work? In other words, in what way-if at all-should the courts respond
to a better model of human decisionmaking that the mind sciences are providing?
We are a team of legal academics, scientists, researchers, and a sitting federal
judge' who seek to answer these difficult questions in accordance with behavioral
realism? Our general goal is to educate those in the legal profession who are

1.
2.

Judge Mark W. Bennett, a coauthor of this article, is a United States District Court Judge in the
Northern District of Iowa.
Behavioral realism is a school of thought that asks the law to account for more accurate models of
human cognition and behavior. See e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness:Imp/hat
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unfamiliar with implicit bias and its consequences. To do so, we provide a current
summary of the underlying science, contextuaized to criminal and civil litigation
processes that lead up to and crescendo in the courtroom. This involves not only
a focused scientific review but also a step-by-step examination of how criminal
and civil trials proceed, followed by suggestions designed to address the harms.
We seek to be useful to legal practitioners of good faith, including judges, who
conclude that implicit bias is a problem (one among many) but do not know quite
what to do about it. While we aim to provide useful and realistic strategies for
those judges already persuaded that implicit bias is a legitimate concern, we also
hope to provoke those who know less about it, or are more skeptical of its relevance,
to consider these issues thoughtfully.
We are obviously not a random sample of researchers and practitioners; thus,
we cannot claim any representative status. That said, the author team represents a
broad array of experience, expertise, methodology, and viewpoints. In authoring
this paper, the team engaged in careful deliberations across topics of both consensus and dissensus. We did not entirely agree on how to frame questions in this
field or how to answer them. That said, we stand collectively behind what we have
written. We also believe the final work product reveals the benefits of such crossdisciplinary and cross-professional collaboration.
Part I provides a succinct scientific introduction to implicit bias, with some
important theoretical clarifications. Often the science can seem too abstract, especially to nonprofessional scientists. As a corrective, Part II applies the science to two
trajectories of bias relevant to the courtroom. One story follows a criminal defendant
path; the other story follows a civil employment discrimination path. Part III

3.

Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 490 (2010); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske,
Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 997, 997-1008 (2006). Jon Hanson and his coauthors have advanced similar
approaches under the names of "critical realism," "situationism," and the "law and mind sciences."
See Adam Benforado, Frames oflnjtsice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.. 1333, 1339 n.28 (2010)
(listing papers).
This paper arose out of the second symposium of PULSE: Program on Understanding Law,
Science, and Evidence at UCLA School of Law, on March 3-4,2011. We brought together leading
scientists (including Anthony Greenwald, the inventor of the Implicit Association Test), federal
and state judges, applied researchers, and legal academics to explore the state of the science regarding
implicit bias research and to examine the various institutional responses to date. The Symposium
also raised possibilities and complications, ranging from the theoretical to practical, from the legal to
the scientific. After a day ofpublic presentations, the author team met in a fill-day dosed session to craft
the outlines of this paper. Judge Michael Linfield of the Los Angeles Superior Court and Jeff
Rachlinski, Professor of Law at Cornell Law School, participated in the symposium but could not
join the author team. Their absence should not be viewed as either agreement or disagreement with
the contents of the Article.
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examines different intervention strategies to counter the implicit biases of key
players in the justice system, such as the judge and jury.
I.
A.

IMPLICIT BIASES

Empirical Introduction

Over the past thirty years, cognitive and social psychologists have
demonstrated that human beings think and act in ways that are often not rational.
We suffer from a long litany of biases, most of them having nothing to do with
gender, ethnicity, or race. For example, we have an oddly stubborn tendency to
anchor to numbers, judgments, or assessments to which we have been exposed
and to use them as a starting point for future judgments-even if those anchors are
objectively wrong.4 We exhibit an endowment effect, with irrational attachments
to arbitrary initial distributions of property, rights, and grants of other entitlements.s
We suffer from hindsight bias and believe that what turns out to be the case today
should have been easily foreseen yesterday.' The list of empirically revealed biases
goes on and on. Indeed, many legal academics have become so familiar with such
heuristics and biases that they refer to them in their analyses as casually as they
refer to economic concepts such as transaction costs.'
One type of bias is driven by attitudes and stereotypes that we have about
social categories, such as genders and races. An attitude is an association between
some concept (in this case a social group) and an evaluative valence, either positive
or negative.8 A stereotype is an association between a concept (again, in this case a
social group) and a trait.' Although interconnected, attitudes and stereotypes
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 667 (1999) (describing anchoring).
See generally Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1227 (2003).
See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A
PositivePsychologicalTheory offudging in Hindsight,65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).
See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories ofJudgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship:A Literature
Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998).
In both common and expert usage, sometimes the word "prejudice" is used to describe a negative attitude, especially when it is strong in magnitude.
If the association is nearly perfect, in that almost every member of the social group has that trait, then
we think of the trait less as a stereotype and more as a defining attribute. Typically, when we use the
word "stereotype," the correlation between social group and trait is far from perfect. See Anthony G.
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: SaentiQcFoundations, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 945,
949 (2006).
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should be distinguished because a positive attitude does not foreclose negative stereotypes and vice versa. For instance, one might have a positive overall attitude
toward African Americans and yet still associate them with weapons. Or, one
might have a positive stereotype of Asian Americans as mathematically able but still
have an overall negative attitude towards them.
The conventional wisdom has been that these social cognitions-attitudes
and stereotypes about social groups-are explicit, in the sense that they are both
consciously accessible through introspection and endorsed as appropriate by the
person who possesses them. Indeed, this understanding has shaped much of
current antidiscrimination law. The conventional wisdom is also that the social
cognitions that individuals hold are relatively stable, in the sense that they operate
in the same way over time and across different situations.
However, recent findings in the mind sciences, especially implicit social
cognition (ISC),'o have undermined these conventional beliefs. As detailed
below, attitudes and stereotypes may also be implicit, in the sense that they are not
consciously accessible through introspection. Accordingly, their impact on a person's
decisionmaking and behaviors does not depend on that person's awareness of
possessing these attitudes or stereotypes. Consequently, they can function automatically, including in ways that the person would not endorse as appropriate if he or she
did have conscious awareness.
How have mind scientists discovered such findings on matters so latent or
implicit? They have done so by innovating new techniques that measure implicit
attitudes and stereotypes that by definition cannot be reliably self-reported. Some
of these measures involve subliminal priming and other treatments that are not
consciously detected within an experimental setting. Other instruments use reaction time differences between two types of tasks-one that seems consistent with
some bias, the other inconsistent-as in the Implicit Association Test (IAT)."

10.

11.

Implicit social cognition (ISC) is a field of psychology that examines the mental processes that affect
social judgments but operate without conscious awareness or conscious control. See generally Kristin
A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REv. L. &
Soc. SC. 427 (2007). The term was first used and defined by Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin
Banaji. See Anthony G. Greenwald &Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:Attitudes, SefEsteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REv. 4 (1995).
See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., MeasuringIndividualDfferences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit
Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464-66 (1998) (introducing the
Implicit Association Test (IAT)). For more information on the TAT, see Brian A. Nosek, Anthony
G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and
Conceptual Review, in AUTOMATIC PROCESSES IN SCIAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 265
(John A. Bargh ed., 2007).
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The well-known IAT is a sorting task that measures time differences
between schema-consistent pairings and schema-inconsistent pairings of concepts,
as represented by words or pictures. For example, suppose we want to test whether
there is an implicit stereotype associating African Americans with weapons. In a
schema-consistent run, the participant is instructed to hit one response key when
she sees a White face or a harmless object, and another response key when she sees
an African American face or a weapon. Notice that the same key is used for both
White and harmless item; a different key is used for both African American and
weapon. Most people perform this task quickly.
In a schema-inconsistent run, we reverse the pairings. In this iteration, the
same key is used for both White and weapon; a different key is used for both
African American and harmless item. Most people perform this task more slowly.12
Of course, the order in which these tasks are presented is always systematically
varied to ensure that the speed of people's responses is not affected by practice.
The time differential between these runs is defined as the implicit association effect
and is statistically processed into standard units called an IAT D score.1 3
Through the IAT, social psychologists from hundreds of laboratories have
collected enormous amounts of data' 4 on reaction-time measures of "implicit
biases," a term we use to denote implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes. According
to these measures, implicit bias is pervasive (widely held),'s large in magnitude (as
compared to standardized measures of explicit bias),'6 dissociated from explicit
biases (which suggests that explicit biases and implicit biases, while related, are

12.
13.

14.

15.
16.

See Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR.
REV. Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 17 (2007).
This D score, which ranges from -2.0 to 2.0, is a standardized score, which is computed by
dividing the IAT effect as measured in milliseconds by the standard deviations of the participants'
latencies pooled across schema-consistent and -inconsistent conditions. See, e.g., Anthony Greenwald
et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: I. An Improved ScoringAlgorithm, 85
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 197 (2003). If an individuafs IAT D score is divided by its
standard deviation of the population that has taken the test, the result is interpretable as the
commonly used effect size measure, Cohen's d.
The most prominent dataset is collected at PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://projectimplicit.org (last visited
Mar. 22, 2012) (providing free online tests of automatic associations). For a broad analysis of this
dataset, see Nosek et al., supra note 12.
Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 10, at 437.
Cohen's d is a standardized unit of the size of a statistical effect. By convention, social scientists mark
0.20, 0.50, and 0.80 as small, medium, and large effect sizes. The IAT effect, as measured in Cohen's d,
on various stereotypes and attitudes range from medium to large. See Kang & Lane, supra note 2, at
474 n.35 (discussing data from Project Implicit). Moreover, the effect sizes of implicit bias against
social groups are frequently larger than the effect sizes produced by explicit bias measures. See idc
. at
474--75 tbl.1.
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separate mental constructs)," and predicts certain kinds of real-world behavior.'
What policymakers are now keen to understand are the size and scope of these
behavioral effects and how to counter them-by altering the implicit biases themselves
and by implementing strategies to attenuate their effects.
Useful and current summaries of the scientific evidence can be found in both
the legal and psychological literatures. For example, in the last volume of this
law review, Jerry Kang and Kristin Lane provided a summary of the evidence
demonstrating that we are not perceptually, cognitively, or behaviorally colorblind."
Justin Levinson and Danielle Young have summarized studies focusing on jury
decisionmaking.2 In the psychology journals, John Jost and colleagues responded
to sharp criticism 2 ' that the IAT studies lacked real-world consequences by
providing a qualitative review of the literature, including ten studies that no
manager should ignore.2 Further, they explained how the findings are entirely
consistent with the major tenets of twentieth century social cognitive psychology.23
In a quantitative review, Anthony Greenwald conducted a meta-analysis of IAT
studies-which synthesizes all the relevant scientific findings-and found that
implicit attitudes as measured by the IAT predicted certain types of behavior,
such as anti-Black discrimination or intergroup discrimination, substantially better
than explicit bias measures. 24
Instead of duplicating these summaries, we offer research findings that are
specific to implicit bias leading up to and in the courtroom. To do so, we chart

17.

18.
19.

20.
21.
22.

23.
24.

See Anthony G. Greenwald & Brian A. Nosek, Attitudinal Dissociation: What Does It Mean?, in
ATTITUDES: INSIGHTS FROM THE NEW IMPLICIT MEASURES 65 (Richard E. Petty, Russell E.
Fazio & Pablo Brifnol eds., 2008).
See Kang & Lane, supra note 2, at 481-90 (discussing evidence of biased behavior in perceiving smiles,
responding to threats, screening resumes, and body language).
See Kang & Lane, supra note 2, at 473-90; see also David L. Faigman, Nilanjana Dasgupta & Cecilia

(Fit:

L. Ridgeway, A Matter
The Law ofDiscrminationand the Science flmplicit Bia, 59 HASTINGS
LJ. 1389 (2008).
SeeJustin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades ofBia: Skin Tone, ImplicitRacialBias,and
Judgments ofAmbiguous Evidence, 112W. VA. L. REV. 307, 319-26 (2010).
See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. TedockAntidiscriminationLaw andthe Perils ofMindreading,
67 OHIO ST. LJ. 1023, 1108-10 (2006).
See, e.g., John T. Jost et al., The Existence flImplicit PrejudiceIs BeyondReaonable Doubt:A Refutation
of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies That No Manager
ShouldIgnore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 41 (2009).
See id.
See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Undertanding and Uing the Implicit Association Test: IHI.MetaAnalysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 19-20 (2009). Implicit
attitude scores
predicted behavior inthis
domain atan average correlation ofr-0.24,whereas explicit
atitude scores had correlations at an average of r=0.12. See id at 24 tbl.3.
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out two case trajectories-one criminal, the other civil. That synthesis appears in
Part 1I.
B.

Theoretical Clarification

But before we leave our introduction to implicit bias, we seek to make some
theoretical clarifications on the relationships between explicit biases, implicit biases,
and structural processes that are all involved in producing unfairness in the
courtroom. We do so because the legal literature has flagged this as an important
issue.25 In addition, a competent diagnosis of unfairness in the courtroom requires
disentangling these various processes. For instance, if the end is to counter discrimination caused by, say, explicit bias, it may be ineffective to adopt means that are
better tailored to respond to implicit bias, and vice versa.
We start by clarifing terms. To repeat, explicit biases are attitudes and stereotypes that are consciously accessible through introspection and endorsed as appropriate. If no social norm against these biases exists within a given context, a person
will freely broadcast them to others. But if such a norm exists, then explicit
biases can be concealed to manage the impressions that others have of us. By
contrast, implicit biases are attitudes and stereotypes that are not consciously accessible through introspection. If we find out that we have them, we may indeed
reject them as inappropriate.
Above, we used the labels "explicit" and "implicit" as adjectives to describe
mental constructs-attitudes and stereotypes. Readers should recognize that these
adjectives can also apply to research procedures or instruments. An explicit
instrument asks the respondent for a direct self-report with no attempt by
researchers to disguise the mental construct that they are measuring. An example
is a straightforward survey question. No instrument perfectly measures a mental
construct. In fact, one can often easily conceal one's explicit bias as measured
through an explicit instrument. In this way, an explicit instrument can poorly measure an explicit bias, as the test subject may choose not to be candid about the
beliefs or attitudes at issue.
By contrast, an implicit instrument does not depend on the respondent's
conscious knowledge of the mental constructs that the researcher is inferring from
the measure. An example is a reaction-time measure, such as the IAT. This does
not necessarily mean that the respondent is unaware that the IAT is measuring bias.

25.

See generally Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias
Matter?:Law, Politics, andRadiallnequality,58 EMORY LJ. 1053 (2009); Stephen M. Rich, Against

Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2011).
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It also does not mean that the respondent is actually unaware that he or she has
implicit biases, for example because she has taken an IAT before or is generally
aware of the research literature. To repeat, no instrument perfectly measures any
mental construct, and this remains true for implicit instruments. One might, for
instance, try to conceal implicit bias measured through an implicit instrument,
but such faking is often much harder than faking explicit bias measured by an
explicit instrument. 26
Finally, besides explicit and implicit biases, another set of processes that
produce unfairness in the courtroom can be called "structural." Other names
include "institutional" or "societal." These processes can lock in past inequalities,
reproduce them, and indeed exacerbate them even without formally treating
persons worse simply because of attitudes and stereotypes about the groups to
which they belong.? In other words, structural bias can produce unfairness even
though no single individual is being treated worse right now because of his or her
membership in a particular social category.
Because thinking through biases with respect to human beings evokes so much
potential emotional resistance, sometimes it is easier to apply them to something
less fraught than gender, race, religion, and the like. So, consider a vegetarian's
biases against meat. He has a negative attitude (that is, prejudice) toward meat.
He also believes that eating meat is bad for his health (a stereotype). He is aware of
this attitude and stereotype. He also endorses them as appropriate. That is, he
feels that it is okay to have a negative reaction to meat. He also believes it accurate
enough to believe that meat is generally bad for human health and that there is no
reason to avoid behaving in accordance with this belief. These are explicit biases.
Now, if this vegetarian is running for political office and campaigning in a
region famous for barbecue, he will probably keep his views to himself. He could,
for example, avoid showing disgust on his face or making critical comments when
a plate of ribs is placed in front of him. Indeed, he might even take a bite and
compliment the cook. This is an example of concealed bias (explicit bias that is
hidden to manage impressions).

26.

See, e.g., Do-Yeong Kim, Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit Association Test (1AT), 66 SOC.

PSYCHOL. Q83, 95-96 (2003).
27.

See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct andAffirmative Action, 82 B.U.
L. REV. 1089, 1117-22 (2002) (applying lock-in theory to explain the inequalities between Blacks
and Whites in education, housing, and employment); john a. powell, Structural Racism: Building
ofJohn Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 795-800 (2008) (adopting a systems
Upon the Insights
approach to describe structured racialization); Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In
ModelofDiscrimination, 86 VA.L.REV. 727, 743-48 (2000) (describing lock-in theory, drawing on
antitrust law and concepts).
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Consider, by contrast, another vegetarian who has recently converted for
environmental reasons. She proclaims explicitly and sincerely a negative attitude
toward meat. But it may well be that she has an implicit attitude that is still slightly
positive. Suppose that she grew up enjoying weekend barbecues with family and
friends, or still likes the taste of steak, or first learned to cook by making roasts.
Whatever the sources and causes, she may still have an implicitly positive attitude
toward meat. This is an implicit bias.
Finally, consider some eating decision that she has to make at a local strip
mall. She can buy a salad for $10 or a cheeseburger for $3. Unfortunately, she has
only $5 to spare and must eat. Neither explicit nor implicit biases much explain
her decision to buy the cheeseburger. She simply lacks the funds to buy the salad,
and her need to eat trumps her desire to avoid meat. The decision was not
driven principally by an attitude or stereotype, explicit or implicit, but by the price.
But what if a careful historical, economic, political, and cultural analysis revealed
multifarious subsidies, political kickbacks, historical contingencies, and economies of scale that accumulated in mutually reinforcing ways to price the salad much
higher than the cheeseburger? These various forces could make it more instrumentally rational for consumers to eat cheeseburgers. This would be an example
of structuralbias in favor of meat.
We disentangle these various mechanisms-explicit attitudes and stereotypes
(sometimes concealed, sometimes revealed), implicit attitudes and stereotypes, and
structural forces-because they pose different threats to fairness everywhere,
including the courtroom. For instance, the threat to fairness posed by jurors with
explicit negative attitudes toward Muslims but who conceal their prejudice to
stay on the jury is quite different from the threat posed by jurors who perceive
themselves as nonbiased but who nevertheless hold negative implicit stereotypes
about Muslims. Where appropriate, we explain how certain studies provide evidence of one type of bias or the other. In addition, we want to underscore that
these various mechanisms-explicit bias, implicit bias, and structural forces-are
not mutually exclusive. 28 To the contrary, they may often be mutually reinforcing. In focusing on implicit bias in the courtroom, we do not mean to suggest

28.

See, e.g., GLENN C. LOU7RY, THEANATOMYOF RACIALINEQUALITY 23-30 (2002) (discussing selfreinforcing stereotypes); john powell & Rachel Godsil, ImplicitBias Iughs as Preconditionsto Stmutural
Change, POVERTY & RACE, Sept./Oct. 2011, at 3, 6 (explaining why "implicit bias insights are
crucial to addressing the substantive inequalities that result from structural racialization").
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that implicit bias is the only or most important problem, or that explicit bias
(revealed or concealed) and structural forces are unimportant or insignificant. 29

II.
A.

Two TRAJECTORIES

The Criminal Path

Consider, for example, some of the crucial milestones in a criminal case
flowing to trial. First, on the basis of a crime report, the police investigate particular
neighborhoods and persons of interest and ultimately arrest a suspect. Second,
the prosecutor decides to charge the suspect with a particular crime. Third, the
judge makes decisions about bail and pretrial detention. Fourth, the defendant
decides whether to accept a plea bargain after consulting his defense attorney,
often a public defender or court-appointed private counsel. Fifth, if the case goes
to trial, the judge manages the proceedings while the jury decides whether the
defendant is guilty. Finally, if convicted, the defendant must be sentenced. At
each of these stages, 0 implicit biases can have an important impact. To maintain
a manageable scope of analysis, we focus on the police encounter, charge and plea
bargain, trial, and sentencing.
1. Police Encounter
Blackness and criminality. If we implicitly associate certain groups, such as
African Americans, with certain attributes, such as criminality, then it should not
be surprising that police may behave in a manner consistent with those implicit
stereotypes. In other words, biases could shape whether an officer decides to stop
an individual for questioning in the first place, elects to interrogate briefly or at
length, decides to frisk the individual, and concludes the encounter with an arrest
versus a warning.31 These biases could contribute to the substantial racial disparities that have been widely documented in policing.32

29.
30.
31.
32.

See Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback From the Lt, 54 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 1139, 1146-48
(2010) (specifically rejecting complaint that implicit bias analysis must engage in reductionism).
The number of stages is somewhat arbitrary. We could have listed more stages in a finer-grained
timeline or vice versa.
Devon W. Carbado, (E)racingthe FourthAmendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 976-77 (2002).
See, e.g., Dianna Hunt, Ticket to TroubleVheels ef Injustice/Certain Areas Are Ticket Traps for
Minorities,HOUS. CHRON., May 14, 1995, at Al (analyzing sixteen million Texas driving records
and finding that minority drivers straying into White neighborhoods in Texas's major urban areas
were twice as likely as Whites to get traffic violations); Sam Vincent Meddis & Mike Snider, Drug
War 'Focused'on Blacks, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 1990, at 1A (reporting findings from a 1989 USA
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Since the mid-twentieth century, social scientists have uncovered empirical evidence of negative attitudes toward African Americans as well as stereotypes
about their being violent and criminal.33 Those biases persist today, as measured
by not only explicit but also implicit instruments. 34
For example, Jennifer Eberhardt, Philip Goff, Valerie Purdie, and Paul
Davies have demonstrated a bidirectional activation between Blackness and criminality.35 When participants are subliminally primed 6 with a Black male face (as
opposed to a White male face, or no prime at all), they are quicker to distinguish
the faint outline of a weapon that slowly emerges out of visual static. 7 In other
words, by implicitly thinking Black, they more quickly saw a weapon.
Interestingly, the phenomenon also happens in reverse. When subliminally
primed with drawings of weapons, participants visually attended to Black male
faces more than comparable White male faces.38 Researchers found this result not
only in a student population, which is often criticized for being unrepresentative
of the real world, but also among police officers.39 The research suggests both that

33.
34.

35.
36.
37.

38.

39.

Today study that 41 percent of those arrested on drug charges were African American whereas 15
percent of the drug-using population is African American); Billy Porterfield, Data Raise Question:
Is the Drug WarRacist?, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 4, 1994, at Al (citing study showing that
African Americans were over seven times more likely than Whites to be arrested on drug charges in
Travis County in 1993).
See generally Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The
Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139 (1995).
In a seminal paper, Patricia Devine demonstrated that being subliminally primed with stereotypically "Black? words prompted participants to evaluate ambiguous behavior as more hostile. See
Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989). The priming words included "Negroes, lazy, Blacks,
blues, rhythm, Africa, stereotype, ghetto, welfare, basketball, unemployed, and plantation." Id at
10. Those who received a heavy dose of priming (80 percent stereotypical words) interpreted a person's
actions as more hostile than those who received a milder dose (20 percent). Id at 11-12; see also John
A. Bargh et al., Automaticity ofSocialBehavior:DirecttEfects fTrait Construtand SteretypeActivation
on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY &SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 238-39 (1996).
See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black Race, Crime, and Visual Processing,87 J. PERSONALITY
&SOC. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004).
The photograph flashed for only thirty milliseconds. Id. at 879.
See id. at 879-80. There was a 21 percent drop in perceptual threshold between White face primes
and Black face primes. This was measured by counting the number of frames (out of a total of 41)
that were required before the participant recognized the outlines of the weapon in both conditions.
There was a 8.8 frame difference between the two conditions. Id. at 881.
Visual attendance was measured via a dot-probe paradigm, which requires participants to indicate on
which side of the screen a dot flashes. The idea is that if a respondent is already looking at one
face (for example, the Black photograph), he or she will see a dot flash near the Black photograph
faster. See id. at 881 (describing dot-paradigm as the gold standard in visual attention measures).
See id at 885-87 (describing methods, procedures, and results of Study 4, which involved sixty-one
police officers who were 76 percent White, 86 percent male, and who had an avenage age of forty-two).
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the idea of Blackness triggers weapons and makes them easier to see, and, simultaneously, that the idea of weapons triggers visual attention to Blackness. How
these findings translate into actual police work is, of course, still speculative. At a
minimum, however, they suggest the possibility that officers have an implicit
association between Blackness and weapons that could affect both their hunches
and their visual attention.
Even if this is the case, one might respond that extra visual attention by
the police is not too burdensome. But who among us enjoys driving with a police
cruiser on his or her tail?40 Moreover, the increased visual attention did not
promote accuracy; instead, it warped the officers' perceptual memories. The subliminal prime of weapons led police officers not only to look more at Black faces but
also to remember them in a biased way, as having more stereotypically African
American features. Thus, they "were more likely to falsely identify a face that was
more stereotypically Black than the target when they were primed with crime
than when they were not primed." 4 '
We underscore a point that is so obvious that it is easy to miss. The primes
in these studies were all flashed subliminally. Thus, the behavioral differences in
visually attending to Black faces and in remembering them more stereotypically
were all triggered implicitly, without the participants' conscious awareness.
Shooter bias. The implicit association between Blackness and weapons has also
been found through other instruments, including other priming tasks4 2 and the TAT.
One of the tests available on Project Implicit specifically examines the implicit
stereotype between African Americans (as compared to European Americans)
and weapons (as compared to harmless items). That association has been found
to be strong, widespread, and dissociated from explicit self-reports. 43
Skeptics can reasonably ask why we should care about minor differentials
between schema-consistent and -inconsistent pairings that are often no more
than a half second. But it is worth remembering that a half second may be all

40.
41.
42.

43.

In this study, the crime primes were not pictures but words: "violent, crime, stop, investigate, arrest,
report, shoot, capture, chase, and apprehend." Id at 886.
See Carbado, supra note 31, at 966-67 (describing existential burdens of heightened police surveillance).
Eberhardt et al., supra note 35, at 887.
See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role ofAutomatic and Controlled Processes in
Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185-86 (2001). The
study deployed a priming paradigm, inwhich aphotograph of a Black or Whiteface was flashed to participants for two hundred milliseconds. Immediately thereafter, participants were shown pictures of guns
or tools. Id at 184. When primed by the Black face, participants identified guns faster. Id. at 185.
For N= 85,742 participants, the average IAT D score was 0.37; Cohen's d= 1.00. By contrast, the selfreported association (that is, the explicit stereotype measure) was Cohen's d-0.31. SeeNosek et al., supra
note 12, at 11 tbl.2.
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the time a police officer has to decide whether to shoot. In the policing context,
that half second might mean the difference between life and death.
Joshua Correll developed a shooter paradigm video game in which participants are confronted with photographs of individuals (targets) holding an object,
superimposed on various city landscapes. 4 4 If the object is a weapon, the
participant is instructed to press a key to shoot. If the object is harmless (for
example, a wallet), the participant must press a different key to holster the weapon.
Correll found that participants were quicker to shoot when the target was Black
as compared to White.4 Also, under time pressure, participants made more
mistakes (false alarms) and shot more unarmed Black targets than unarmed
White targets, and failed to shoot more armed White targets (misses) than armed Black
targets.46 Interestingly, the shooter bias effect was not correlated with measures
of explicit personal stereotypes.47 Correll also found comparable amounts of
shooter bias in African American participants.4 8 This suggests that negative attitudes
toward African Americans are not what drive the phenomenon.4
The shooter bias experiments have also been run on actual police officers,
with mixed results. In one study, police officers showed the same bias in favor of
shooting unarmed Blacks more often than unarmed Whites that student and
civilian populations demonstrated.s In another study, however, although police
officers showed a similar speed bias, they did not show any racial bias in the

44.

45.
46.

47.

48.
49.

50.

Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially
Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1315-17 (2002) (describing
the procedure).
Id.at 1317.
Id at 1319. For qualifications about how the researchers discarded outliers, see Jerry Kang, Trojan
Horses ofRace, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1493 n.16 (2005). Subsequent studies have confirmed
Correll's general findings. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets ofDiscrimination:Effects
of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399 (finding
similar results).
Correll et al., supra note 44, at 1323. The scales used were the Modern Racism Scale, the
Discrimination and Diversity Scale, the Motivation to Control Prejudiced Responding Scale, and some
questions from the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale and the Personal Need for Structure Scale for
good measure. Id at 1321. These are survey instruments that are commonly used in social
psychological research. Shooter bias was, however, correlated with measures of societal stereotypes-the stereotypes that other people supposedly held. Id at 1323.
See id.at 1324.
On explicit attitude instruments, African Americans show on average substantial in-group
preference (over Whites). On implicit attitude instruments, such as the IAT, African Americans bell
curve around zero, which means that they show no preference on average. See Brian A. Nosek,
Mahzarin R. Banaji &Anthony G. Greenwald, HarvestingImplicit Group Attitudes and Belitfs From
a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY RES. &PRACTICE 101, 105-06 (2002).
See E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences ofRacefor Police Officers' Responses to
CriminalSubjects,
16 PSYCHOL. Scl. 180,181 (2005).

HeinOnline -- 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1138 2011-2012

Implicit Bias in the Courtroom

1139

most important criterion of accuracy. In other words, there was no higher error
rate of shooting unarmed Blacks as compared to Whites.s
Finally, in a study that directly linked implicit stereotypes (with weapons) as
measured by the IAT and shooter bias, Jack Glaser and Eric Knowles found
that "[i]ndividuals possessing a relatively strong stereotype linking Blacks and weapons [one standard deviation above the mean IATJ clearly show the Shooter
Bias."52 By contrast, recall that Correll found no such correlation with explicit
stereotypes. These findings are consistent with the implicit stereotype story. Of
course, it may also be true that participants were simply downplaying or concealing
their explicit bias, which could help explain why no correlation was found.
In sum, we have evidence that suggests that implicit biases could well influence various aspects of policing. A fairly broad set of research findings shows that
implicit biases (as measured by implicit instruments) alter and affect numerous
behaviors that police regularly engage in-visual surveillance, recall, and even
armed response.s It should go without saying that explicit biases, which often
undergird unspoken policies of racial profiling, also play an enormous role in the
differential policing of people of color. It also should go without saying that
various structural forces that produce racially segregated, predominantly minority
neighborhoods that have higher poverty and crime rates also have a huge impact on
racialized policing. Nevertheless, we repeat these points so that readers internalize
the idea that implicit, explicit, and structural processes should not be deemed
mutually exclusive.
2. Charge and Plea Bargain
Journalistic investigations have uncovered some statistical evidence that
racial minorities are treated worse than Whites in prosecutors' charging decisions. 54

51.

52.
53.

54.

SeeJoshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers andRaciallBias in the Decision to Shoot,
92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1010-13, 1016-17 (2007) (describing the results
from two studies).
Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to ControlPrejudice,44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 164, 169 (2008).
For discussions in the law reviews, with some treatment of implicit biases, see Alex Geisinger,
RethinkingProfling:A CognitiveModel ofBias and Its Legal Implications, 86 OR.L. REV. 657, 667-73
(2007) (providing a cognitive model based on automatic categorization in accordance with behavioral realism).
For example, in San Jose, a newspaper investigation concluded that out of the almost seven hundred
thousand criminal cases reported, "at virtually every stage of pre-trial negotiation, whites are more
successful than non-whites." Ruth Marcus, Racial Bias Widely Seen in Criminaljustice System;
Research Often SupportiBlack Perceptions, WASH. PosT, May 12, 1992, at A4. San Francisco
Public Defender Jeff Brown commented on racial stereotyping: "If's a feeling,
You've got a nice
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Of course, there might be some legitimate reason for those disparities if, for
example, minorities and Whites are not similarly situated on average. One way
to examine whether the merits drive the disparate results is to control for everything
except some irrelevant attribute, such as race. In several studies, researchers used
regression analyses to conclude that race was indeed independently correlated with
the severity of the prosecutor's charge.
For example, in a 1985 study of charging decisions by prosecutors in Los
Angeles, researchers found prosecutors more likely to press charges against
Black than White defendants, and determined that these charging disparities
could not be accounted for by race-neutral factors, such as prior record, seriousness of charge, or use of a weapon.ss Two studies also in the late 1980s, one in
Florida and the other in Indiana, found charging discrepancies based on the race
of the victim. 6 At the federal level, a U.S. Sentencing Commission report found
that prosecutors were more apt to offer White defendants generous plea bargains
with sentences below the prescribed guidelines than to offer them to Black or
Latino defendants."
While these studies are suggestive, other studies find no disparate treatment. 8
Moreover, this kind of statistical evidence does not definitively tell us that biases

55.
56.

57.

58.

person screwing up,' as opposed to feeling that 'this minority is on a track and eventually they're
going to end up in state prison."' Christopher H. Schmitt, Why PleaBargains RJfect Bias, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 9, 1991, at 1A; see also Christopher Johns, The Color offustice: More and
More, Research Shows Minorities Aren't Treated the Same asAnglos by the CriminalJusticeSystem, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, July 4, 1993, at C1 (citing several reports showing disparate treatment of Blacks in the
criminal justice system).
See Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial
Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19
LAw & Soc'Y REv. 587, 615-19 (1985).
See Kenneth B. Nunn, The "Darden Dilemma": Should African Americans Prosecute Crimes?, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1493 (2000) (citing Martha A. Myers &John Hagan, Private and Public
Trouble. Prosecutors and the Allocation of Court Resources, 26 Soc. PROBS. 439, 441-47 (1979));
Radelet & Pierce, supra note 55, at615-19.
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
THE CRIINALJUSTICE SYSTEM 12 n.41 (2000), available athttp://www.protectcivilights.org/pdf/
reports/justice.pdf (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1995)); see
abo Kevin McNally, Race and Federal
Death Penaly:A NonexistentProblem Gets Worse, 53 DEPAJTL L. REV. 1615 (2004) (compiling studies
on the death penalty).
See, e.g., Jeremy D. Ball, Is It a Prosecutor's World? Determinants of Count BargainingDecisions, 22 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 241 (2006) (finding no correlation between race and the willingness of
prosecutors to reduce charges in order to obtain guilty pleas but acknowledging that the study did not
include evaluation of the original arrest report); Cyndy Caravelis et al., Race, Ethnicity, Threat, and
the Desiyation (Career Ofenas, 2011 JUST. Q1 (showing that in some counties, Blacks and Latinos
are more likely than Whites with similar profiles to be prosecuted as career offenders, but in other
counties with different demographics, Blacks and Latinos have a lesser likelihood of such prosecution).
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generally or implicit biases specifically produce discriminatory charging decisions
or plea offers by prosecutors, or a discriminatory willingness to accept worse plea
bargains on the part of defense attorneys. The best way to get evidence on such
hypotheses would be to measure the implicit biases of prosecutors and defense
attorneys and investigate the extent to which those biases predict different
treatment of cases otherwise identical on the merits.
Unfortunately, we have very little data on this front. Indeed, we have no
studies, as of yet, that look at prosecutors' and defense attorneys' implicit biases
and attempt to correlate them with those individuals' charging practices or plea
bargains. Nor do we know as much as we would like about their implicit biases
more generally. But on that score, we do know something. Start with defense
attorneys. One might think that defense attorneys, repeatedly put into the role of
interacting with what is often a disproportionately minority clientele, and often ideologically committed to racial equalitys 9 might have materially different implicit
biases from the general population. But Ted Eisenberg and Sheri Lynn Johnson
found evidence to the contrary: Even capital punishment defense attorneys show negative implicit attitudes toward African Americans. 60 Their implicit attitudes toward
Blacks roughly mirrored those of the population at large.
What about prosecutors? To our knowledge, no one has measured specifically the implicit biases held by prosecutors.6 1 That said, there is no reason to

59.

60.

61.

See Gordon B. Moskowitz, Amanda R. Salomon & Constance M. Taylor, Preconsciously Controlling
Stereotyping: Implicitly Activated Egalitarian Goals Prevent the Activation of Stereotypes, 18 Soc.
COGNITION 151, 155-56 (2000) (showing that "chronic egalitarians" who are personally committed
to removing bias in themselves do not exhibit implicit attitudinal preference for Whites over Blacks).
See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit RacialAttitudes ofDeath Penalty Lawyers,
53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1539, 1545-55 (2004). The researchers used a paper-pencil TAT that measured
attitudes about Blacks and Whites. Id at 1543-45. The defense attorneys displayed biases that were
comparable to the rest of the population. Id. at 1553. The findings by Moskowitz and colleagues,
supranote 59, sit in some tension with findings by Eisenberg and Johnson. It is possible that defense
attorneys are not chronic egalitarians and/or that the specific practice of criminal defense work
exacerbates implicit biases even among chronic egalitarians.
In some contexts, prosecutors have resisted revealing information potentially related to their
biases. For example, in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the indictment for selective prosecution, arguing that the U.S. Attorney prosecuted virtually
all African Americans charged with crack offenses in federal court but left all White crack defendants
to be prosecuted in state court, resulting in much longer sentences for identical offenses. Id. at 460-61.
The claim foundered when the U.S. Attorney's Office resisted the defendants' discovery motion
concerning criteria for prosecutorial decisions and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the U.S. Attorney's
Office's refusal to provide discovery. Id. at 459-62. The Court held that, prior to being entitled
even to discovery, defendants claiming selective prosecution cases based on race must produce credible
evidence that "similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted." Id. at 465.
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presume attorney exceptionalism in terms of implicit biases. 62 And if defense
attorneys, who might be expected to be less biased than the population, show typical amounts of implicit bias, it would seem odd to presume that prosecutors would
somehow be immune. If this is right, there is plenty of reason to be concerned
about how these biases might play out in practice.
As we explain in greater detail below, the conditions under which implicit
biases translate most readily into discriminatory behavior are when people have
wide discretion in making quick decisions with little accountability. Prosecutors
function in just such environments.
They exercise tremendous discretion to
decide whether, against whom, and at what level of severity to charge a particular crime; they also influence the terms and likelihood of a plea bargain and the
length of the prison sentence-a with little judicial oversight. Other psychological theories-such as confirmation bias, social judgeability theory, and shifting
standards, which we discuss below 64-reinforce our hypothesis that prosecutorial
decisionmaking indeed risks being influenced by implicit bias.
3. Trial
a. Jury
If the case goes to the jury, what do we know about how implicit biases
might influence the factfinder's decisionmaking? There is a long line of research
on racial discrimination by jurors, mostly in the criminal context. Notwithstanding some mixed findings, the general research consensus is that jurors of one
race tend to show bias against defendants who belong to another race ("racial
outgroups"). For example, White jurors will treat Black defendants worse than
they treat comparable White defendants. The best and most recent meta-analysis
of laboratory juror studies was performed by Tara Mitchell and colleagues, who
found that the fact that a juror was of a different race than the defendant influenced

62.

63.

64.

Several of the authors have conducted training sessions with attorneys in which we run the IAT in
the days leading up to the training. The results of these IATs have shown that attorneys harbor biases
that are similar to those harbored by the rest of the population. One recent study of a related population,
law students, confirmed that they too harbor implicit gender biases. See Justin D. Levinson &
Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the LegalPrge/uionAn EmpircalStudy, 18 DUKE J. GENDER
L. &PoL'Y 1, 28-31 (2010).
See Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact oflmplicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of
ProsecutonalDiscretion,35 SEATTLE L. REv. 795 (2012) (undertaking a step-by-step consideration
of how prosecutorial discretion maybe fraught with implicit bias).
See infra Part IIB.
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both verdicts and sentencing.6 The magnitude of the effect sizes were measured
conservatively6 6 and found to be small (Cohen's d=0.092 for verdicts, d=0.185 for
sentencing)."6

But effects deemed "small" by social scientists may nonetheless have huge
consequences for the individual, the social category he belongs to, and the entire society. For example, if White juries rendered guilty verdicts in exactly 80 percent of
their decisions, 68 then an effect size of Cohen's d=0.095 would mean that the rate
of conviction for Black defendants will be 83.8 percent, compared to 76.2 percent
for White defendants. Put another way, in one hundred otherwise identical
trials, eight more Black than White defendants would be found guilty.69
One might assume that juror bias against racial outgroups would be greater
when the case is somehow racially charged or inflamed, as opposed to those
instances when race does not explicitly figure in the crime. Interestingly, many
experiments have demonstrated just the opposite. 70 Sam Sommers and Phoebe
Ellsworth explain the counterintuitive phenomenon in this way: When the case is
racially charged, jurors-who want to be fair-respond by being more careful
and thoughtful about race and their own assumptions and thus do not show bias
in their deliberations and outcomes. By contrast, when the case is not racially
charged, even though there is a Black defendant and a White victim, jurors are
not especially vigilant about the possibility of racial bias influencing their

65.

66.

Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of
Dejendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 627-28 (2005). The meta-analysis processed
thirty-four juror verdict studies (with 7397 participants) and sixteen juror sentencing studies (with
3141 participants). Id at 625. All studies involved experimental manipulation of the defendant's
race. Multirace participant samples were separated out in order to maintain the study's definition of
racial bias as ajuror's differential treatment of a defendant who belonged to a racial outgroup. See id.
Studies that reported nonsignificant results (p>0.05) for which effect sizes could not be calculated
were given effect sizes of 0.00. Id.

67.
68.

69.

70.

Idat 629.
See TRACY KYCKELHAHN & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 221152, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES,
2004, at 1, 3 (2008), availableat http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc04.pdf ("Seventy-nine
percent of trials resulted in a guilty verdict or judgment, including 82% of bench trials and 76% of
jury trials."); see also THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 228944, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN
COUNTIES, 2006, at 1 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf
(reporting the "typical" outcome as three out of four trials resulting in convictions).
This translation between effect size d values and outcomes was described by Robert Rosenthal &
Donald B. Rubin, A Simple, GeneralPuirposeDisplay ofMagnitude ofExperimentalEffect, 74J. EDUC.
PSYCHOL. 166 (1982).
See, e.g, Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, "Race Salience" in JurorDerisionMaking
Misconceptions, Clarifications,and UnansweredQuestions, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 599 (2009).
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decisionmaking. These findings are more consistent with an implicit bias than a
concealed explicit bias explanation. 7 '
So far, we know that race effects have been demonstrated in juror studies
(sometimes in counterintuitive ways), but admittedly little is known about "the
precise psychological processes through which the influence of race occurs in the
legal context."72 Our default assumption is juror unexceptionalism-given that
implicit biases generally influence decisionmaking, there is no reason to presume
that citizens become immune to the effects of these biases when they serve in the
role ofjurors. Leading scholars from the juror bias field have expressly raised the possibility that the psychological mechanisms might be "unintentional and even
non-conscious processes."73
Some recent juror studies by Justin Levinson and Danielle Young have
tried to disentangle the psychological mechanisms ofjuror bias by using the IAT
and other methods. In one mock juror study, Levinson and Young had participants view five photographs of a crime scene, including a surveillance camera
photo that featured a masked gunman whose hand and forearm were visible. For
half the participants, that arm was dark skinned; for the other half, that arm was
lighter skinned.74 The participants were then provided twenty different pieces of
trial evidence. The evidence was designed to produce an ambiguous case regarding
whether the defendant was indeed the culprit. Participants were asked to rate
how much the presented evidence tended to indicate the defendant's guilt or innocence and to decide whether the defendant was guilty or not, using both a scale of
guilty or not guilty and a likelihood scale of zero to one hundred.75
The study found that the subtle manipulation of the skin color altered how
jurors evaluated the evidence presented and also how they answered the crucial
question "How guilty is the defendant?" The guilt mean score was M= 66.97 for

71.

72.

See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White furor Bias. An Invesigation of Prejudice

Against Black Dcfendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 201, 255
(2001); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom:Perceptions of Guilt and
DispositionalAttributions,26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367 (2000). That said,
one could still hold to an explicit bias story in the following way The juror has a negative attitude or
stereotype that he is consciously aware of and endorses. But he knows it is not socially acceptable
so he conceals it. When a case is racially charged, racial bias is more salient, so other jurors will be on
the lookout for bias. Accordingly, the juror conceals it even more, all the way up to making sure that
his behavior is completely race neutral. This explicit bias story is not mutually exclusive with the
implicit bias story we are telling.
Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision-Making offuries, 12 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 171, 172 (2007).

73.

Idatl175.

74.
75.

Id at 334.

Levinson &Young, supra note 20, at 332-33 (describing experimental procedures).
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dark skin and M=56.37 for light skin, with 100 being "definitely guilty."76 Measures
of explicit bias, including the Modem Racism Scale and feeling thermometers,
showed no statistically significant correlation with the participants' weighing of the
evidence or assessment of guilt.7 More revealing, participants were asked to recall
the race of the masked robber (which was a proxy for the light or dark skin), but
many could not recall it.] Moreover, their recollections did not correlate with their
judgments of guilt. Taken together, these findings suggest that implicit bias-not
explicit, concealed bias, or even any degree of conscious focus on race-was influencing how jurors assessed the evidence in the case.
In fact, there is even clearer evidence that implicit bias was at work.
Levinson, Huajian Cai, and Young also constructed a new IAT, the Guilty-Not
Guilty IAT, to test implicit stereotypes of African Americans as guilty (not innocent)."
They gave the participants this new IAT and the general race attitude IAT. They
found that participants showed an implicit negative attitude toward Blacks as well
as a small implicit stereotype between Black and guilty." More important than the
bias itself is whether it predicts judgment. On the one hand, regression analysis
demonstrated that a measure of evidence evaluation was a function of both the
implicit attitude and the implicit stereotype. 82 On the other hand, the IAT scores
did not predict what is arguably more important: guilty verdicts or judgments of
guilt on a more granular scale (from zero to one hundred).83 In sum, a subtle change

76.
77.
78.

See id. at 337 (confirming that the difference was statistically significant, F=4.40, p=0.034, d=0.52).
Id at 338.
This finding built upon Levinson's previous experimental study of implicit memory bias in legal
decisionmaking. See Justin D. Levinson, ForgottenRacialEquality:ImplicitBias,Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 398-406 (2007) (finding that study participants misremembered
trial-relevant facts in racially biased ways).

79.

Levinson &Young, supra note 20, at 338.

80.

Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Bia: The Guilty-Not Guilty
ImplicitAssociation Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187 (2010).
Id at 204. For the attitude TAT, D=0.21 (p<0.01). Id. at 204 n.87. For the Guilty-Not Guilty IAT,
D=0.18 (p<0.01). Id at 204 n.83.
Participants rated each of the twenty pieces of information (evidence) in terms of its probity
regarding guilt or innocence on a 1-7 scale. This produced a total "evidence evaluation" score that could
range between 20 (least amount of evidence of guilt) to 140 (greatest). I. at 202 n.70 (citation
omitted). The greater the Black= guilty stereotype or the greater the negative attitude toward Blacks, the
higher the guilty evidence evaluation. The ultimate regression equation was: Evidence = 88.58 + 5.74 x
BW + 6.61 x GI + 9.11 x Al + e (where BW stands for Black or White suspect; GI stands for guilty
stereotype IAT score; Al stands for race attitude TAT score; e stands for error). Id. at 206. In
normalized units, the implicit stereotype 0=0.25 (p<0.05); the implicit attitude 0=0.34 (p<0.01);
adjusted?
R20.24. See i, at 206 nn.93-95.
Idt at 206n.95.

81.
82.

83.
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in skin color changed judgments of evidence and guilt; implicit biases measured
by the JAT predicted how respondents evaluated identical pieces of information.
We have a long line of juror research, as synthesized through a metaanalysis, revealing that jurors of one race treat defendants of another race worse with
respect to verdict and sentencing. According to some experiments, that difference
might take place more often in experimental settings when the case is not racially
charged, which suggests that participants who seek to be fair will endeavor to
correct for potential bias when the threat of potential race bias is obvious. Finally,
some recent work reveals that certain IATs can predict racial discrimination in the
evaluation of evidence by mock jurors. Unfortunately, because of the incredible
difficulties in research design, we do not have studies that evaluate implicit bias in
real criminal trials. Accordingly, the existing body of research, while strongly suggestive, provides inferential rather than direct support that implicit bias accounts for
some of the race effects on conviction and sentencing.
b. Judge
Obviously, the judge plays a crucial role in various aspects of the trial, exercising important discretion in setting bail, 4 deciding motions, conducting and
deciding what can be asked during jury selection, ruling on the admissibility of
evidence, presiding over the trial, and rendering verdicts in some cases. Again, as
with the lawyers, there is no inherent reason to think that judges are immune
from implicit biases. The extant empirical evidence supports this assumption. 5 Jeff
Rachlinski and his coauthors are the only researchers who have measured the
implicit biases of actual trial court judges. They have given the race attitude IAT to
judges from three different judicial districts. Consistent with the general population, the White judges showed strong implicit attitudes favoring Whites over Blacks."

84.

85.

86.

See Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Testfor Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 987, 992 (1994) (finding 35 percent higher bail amounts for Black defendants after controlling
for eleven other variables besides race).
Judge Bennett, a former civil rights lawyer, shares his unnerving discovery of his own disappointing
IAT results in Mark W. Bennett, Unravelingthe Gordian Knot oflmplicitBias injury Selection: The
Problems offudge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise 9fBatson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HAR.
L. &PoL'Y REv. 149, 150 (2010).
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trialjudges?8, 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1195, 1210 (2009). White judges (N=85) showed an IAT effect M=216 ms (with a
standard deviation of 201 ms). 87.1 percent of them were quicker to sort in the schema-consistent
arrangement than in the schema-inconsistent one. Black judges (N=43) showed a small bias M=26
ms (with a standard deviation of 208 ins). Only 44.2 percent of Black judges were quicker to soft in
the schema-consistent arrangement than in the schema-inconsistent one. See id.

HeinOnline -- 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1146 2011-2012

Implicit Bias in the Courtroom

1147

Rachlinski and colleagues investigated whether these biases predicted behavioral differences by giving judges three different vignettes and asking for their
views on various questions, ranging from the likelihood of defendant recidivism to
the recommended verdict and confidence level. Two of these vignettes revealed
nothing about race, although some of the judges were subliminally primed with
words designed to trigger the social category Aflican American. The third vignette
explicitly identified the defendant (and victim) as White or Black and did not use
subliminal primes. After collecting the responses, Rachlinski et al. analyzed whether
judges treated White or Black defendants differently and whether the IAT could
predict any such difference.
They found mixed results. In the two subliminal priming vignettes, judges
did not respond differently on average as a function of the primes. In other words,
the primes did not prompt them to be harsher on defendants across the board as
prior priming studies with nonjudge populations had found. 7 That said, the
researchers found a marginally statistically significant interaction with IAT scores:
Judges who had a greater degree of implicit bias against Blacks (and relative
preference for Whites) were harsher on defendants (who were never racially identifled) when they had been primed (with the Black words). By contrast, those judges
who had implicit attitudes in favor of Blacks were less harsh on defendants when
they received the prime."
In the third vignette, a battery case that explicitly identified the defendant as
one race and the victim as the other," the White judges showed equal likelihood
of convicting the defendant, whether identified as White or Black. By contrast,
Black judges were much more likely to convict the defendant if he was identified
as White as compared to Black. When the researchers probed more deeply to
see what, if anything, the IAT could predict, they did not find the sort of interaction
that they found in the other two vignettes-in other words, judges with strong
implicit biases in favor of Whites did not treat the Black defendant more harshly.90
Noticing the difference between White and Black judge responses in the
third vignette study, the researchers probed still deeper and found a three-way
interaction between a judge's race, a judge's TAT score, and a defendant's race. No
effect was found for White judges; the core finding concerned, instead, Black
87.
88.

89.

90.

See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent
Offenders, 28 LAW &HiM. BEHAv. 483 (2004).
See Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1215. An ordered logit regression was performed between the
judge's disposition against the priming condition, IAT score, and their interaction. The interaction
term was marginally significant atp=0.07. See id. at 1214-15 n.94.
This third vignette did not use any subliminal primes.
See id. at 1202 n.41.
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judges. Those Black judges with a stronger Black preference on the IAT were
less likely to convict the Black defendant (as compared to the White defendant);
correlatively, those Black judges with a White preference on the IAT were more likely
to convict the Black defendant.91
It is hard to make simple sense of such complex findings, which may have
been caused in part by the fact that the judges quickly sniffed out the purpose of the
study-to detect racial discrimination.92 Given the high motivation not to perform
race discrimination under research scrutiny, one could imagine that White judges
might make sure to correct for any potential unfairness. By contrast, Black
judges may have felt less need to signal racial fairness, which might explain why
Black judges showed different behaviors as a function of implicit bias whereas White
judges did not.
Put another way, data show that when the race of the defendant is
explicitly identified to judges in the context of a psychology study (that is, the third
vignette), judges are strongly motivated to be fair, which prompts a different
response from White judges (who may think to themselves "whatever else, make
sure not to treat the Black defendants worse") than Black judges (who may
think "give the benefit of the doubt to Black defendants"). However, when race is
not explicitly identified but implicitly primed (vignettes one and two), perhaps
the judges' motivation to be accurate and fair is not on full alert. Notwithstanding all the complexity, this study provides some suggestive evidence that implicit
attitudes may be influencing judges' behavior.
4. Sentencing
There is evidence that African Americans are treated worse than similarly
situated Whites in sentencing. For example, federal Black defendants were sentenced to 12 percent longer sentences under the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984,93 and Black defendants are subject disproportionately to the death penalty.94

91.
92.
93.

94.

Id. at 1220 n.114.
See id. at 1223.
See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence From the US.
Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 300 (2001) (examining federal judge sentencing under the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO GGD-90-57, REPORT TO THE SENATE AND
HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990) (finding killers of White victims receive
the death penalty more often than killers of Black victims); David C. Baldus et al., Racial
Discriminationand the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era:An Empiricaland Legal Overview,
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Of course, it is possible that there is some good reason for that difference, based
on the merits. One way to check is to run experimental studies holding everything
constant except for race.
Probationoffcers. In one study, Sandra Graham and Brian Lowery subliminally primed police officers and juvenile probation officers with words related to
African Americans, such as "Harlem" or "dreadlocks." This subliminal priming
led the officers to recommend harsher sentencing decisions. 5 As we noted above,
Rachlinski et al. found no such effect on the judges they tested using a similar but
not identical method.96 But, at least in this study, an effect was found with
police and probation officers. Given that this was a subliminal prime, the merits
could not have justified the different evaluations.
Aftocentricfeatures. Irene Blair, Charles Judd, and Kristine Chapleau took
photographs from a database of criminals convicted in Florida97 and asked participants to judge how Afrocentric both White and Black inmates looked on a scale of
one to nine." The goal was to see if race, facial features, or both correlated with
actual sentencing. Using multiple regression analysis, the researchers found that
after controlling for the seriousness of the primary and additional offenses, the race of
the defendant showed no statistical significance." In other words, White and Black
defendants were sentenced without discrimination based on race. According to the

95.
96.

97.
98.

99.

With Recent Findings From Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1710-24 (1998) (finding
mixed evidence that Black defendants are more likely to receive the death sentence).
See Graham & Lowery, supra note 87.
Priming studies are quite sensitive to details. For example, the more subliminal a prime is (in time
duration and in frequency), the less the prime tends to stick (the smaller the effects and the faster it
dissipates). Rachlinski et al. identified some differences between their experimental procedure and that
of Graham and Lowery's. See Rachlinski et al., supranote 86, at 1213 n.88. Interestingly, in the Radlinski
study, for judges ftom the eastern conference (seventy judges), a programming error made their subliminal primes last only sixty-four milliseconds. By contrast, for the western conference (forty-five
judges), the prime lasted 153 milliseconds, which was dose to the duration used by Graham and
Lowery (150 milliseconds). See id at 1206 (providing numerical count ofjudges' prime); id at 1213
n.84 (identifing the programming error). Graham and Lowery wrote that they selected the priming
durations through extensive pilot testing "to arrive at a presentation time that would allow the
primes to be detectable but not identifiable." Graham & Lowery, supranote 87, at 489. It is possible
that the truncated priming duration for the eastern conference judges contributed to the different
findings between Rachlinski et al. and Graham and Lowery.
See Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence ofAfrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing, 15
PSYCHOL. SCI. 674, 675 (2004) (selecting a sample of 100 Black inmates and 116 White inmates).
Id. at 676. Afrocentric meant full lips, broad nose, relatively darker skin color, and curly hair. It is what
participants socially understood to look African without any explicit instruction or definition. See id.
at 674 n.1
Id at 676.
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researchers, this is a success story based on various sentencing reforms specifically
adopted by Florida mostly to decrease sentencing discretion.'
However, when the researchers added Afrocentricity of facial features into
their regressions, they found a curious correlation. Within each race, either Black
or White, the more Afrocentric the defendant looked, the harsher his punishment.' 0'
How much so? If you picked a defendant who was one standard deviation above
the mean in Afrocentric features and compared him to another defendant of the
same race who was one standard deviation below the mean, there would be a sentence difference of seven to eight months between them, holding constant any
difference in their actual crime.102
Again, if the research provides complex findings, we must grapple with a
complex story. On the one hand, we have good news: Black and White defendants were, overall, sentenced comparably. On the other hand, we have bad
news: Within each race, the more stereotypically Black the defendant looked,
the harsher the punishment. What might make sense of such results? According
to the researchers, perhaps implicit bias was responsible.' 03 Ifjudges are motivated to
avoid racial discrimination, they may be on guard regarding the dangers of treating
similarly situated Blacks worse than Whites. On alert to this potential bias, the
judges prevent it from causing any discriminatory behavior. By contrast, judges have
no conscious awareness that Afrocentric features might be triggering stereotypes
of criminality and violence that could influence their judgment. Without such
awareness, they could not explicitly control or correct for the potential bias.104 If
this explanation is correct, we have further evidence that discrimination is
being driven in part by implicit biases and not solely by explicit-but-concealed biases.

Where does this whirlwind tour of psychological research findings leave us?
In each of the stages of the criminal trial process discussed, the empirical research

100. 1dat 677.
101. Id. at 676-77. Jennifer Eberhardt and her colleagues reached consistent findings when she used the
same Florida photograph dataset to examine how Black defendants were sentenced to death. After
performing a median split on how stereotypical the defendant looked, the top half were sentenced to
death 57.5 percent of the time compared to the bottom half which were sentenced to death only 24.4
percent of the time. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality
qf Black Dfendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SC. 383, 384 (2006).
Interestingly, this effect was not observed when the victim was Black. See id. at 385.
102. See Blair et al., supra note 97, at 677-78.
103. Seeid at 678 (hypothesizing that "perhaps an equallypernicious and less ntllable process [is] atwork").
10 4. See idat 677.
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gives us reason to think that implicit biases-attitudes and beliefs that we are not
directly aware of and may not endorse-could influence how defendants are
treated and judged. Wherever possible, in our description of the studies, we have
tried to provide the magnitude of these effects. But knowing precisely how much
work they really do is difficult. If we seek an estimate, reflective of an entire
body of research and not any single study, one answer comes from the Greenwald
meta-analysis, which found that the IAT (the most widely used, but not the
only measure of implicit bias) could predict 5.6 percent of the variation of the behavior in Black-White behavioral domains.' 05
Should that be deemed a lot or a little? In answering this question, we
should be mindful of the collective impact of such biases, integrated over time
(per person) and over persons (across all defendants).1 0 6 For a single defendant,
these biases may surface for various decisionmakers repeatedly in policing, charging, bail, plea bargaining, pretrial motions, evidentiary motions, witness credibility,
lawyer persuasiveness, guilt determination, sentencing recommendations, sentencing itself, appeal, and so on. Even small biases at each stage may aggregate into
a substantial effect.
To get a more concrete sense, Anthony Greenwald has produced a simulation that models cumulating racial disparities through five sequential stages of
criminal justice-arrest, arraignment, plea bargain, trial, and sentence. It supposes that the probability of arrest having committed the offense is 0.50, that
the probability of conviction at trial is 0.75, and that the effect size of implicit
bias is r=0.1 at each stage. Under this simulation, for a crime with a mean sentence
of 5 years, and with a standard deviation of 2 years, Black criminals can expect a
sentence of 2.44 years whereas White criminals can expect just 1.40 years.107 To
appreciate the full social impact, we must next aggregate this sort of disparity a
second time over all defendants subject to racial bias, out of an approximate annual

105.

See Greenwald et al., supra note 24, at 24 tbl.3 (showing that correlation between race attitude IAT
(Black/White) and behavior in the meta-analysis is 0.236, which when squared equals 0.056, the
percentage of variance explained).
106. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1202; Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures: A
BehavioralRealistRevision of AffirmativeAction,' 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1073 (2006).
107. The simulation is available at Simulation: Cumulating RacialDisparitiesThrough 5 Sequential Stages of
Criminaljustice, http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/UCLAPULSE.simulation.xlsx (last visited
May 15, 2012). If in the simulation the effect size of race discrimination at each step is increased
from r=0.1 to r=0.2, which is less than the average effect size of race discrimination effects found in
the 2009 meta-analysis, see supra note 105, the ratio of expected years of sentence would increase to
3.11 years (Black) to 1.01 years (White).
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total of 20.7 million state criminal casesos and 70 thousand federal criminal cases. 09
And, as Robert Abelson has demonstrated, even small percentages of variance
explained might amount to huge impacts." 0
B.

The Civil Path

Now, we switch from the criminal to the civil path and focus on the
trajectory of an individual"' bringing suit in a federal employment discrimination
case-and on how implicit bias might affect this process. First, the plaintiff, who is
a member of a protected class, believes that her employer has discriminated against
her in some legally cognizable way." 2 Second, after exhausting necessary administrative remedies,"' the plaintiff sues in federal court. Third, the defendant tries to
terminate the case before trial via a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6). Fourth, should that
fail, the defendant moves for summary judgment under FRCP 56. Finally, should
that motion also fail, the jury renders a verdict after trial. Again, at each of these

See ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK
OF STATE COURTs: AN ANALYSIS OF 2009 STATE COURT CASELOADS 3 (2011), available at
http://www.courtstatistics.org/FlashMicrosites/CSP/images/CSP2009.pdf.
109. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1202.
110. See Robert P. Abelson, A Variance ExplanationParadox: When a Little Is a Lot, 97 PSYCHOL. BULL.
129, 132 (1985) (explaining that the batting average of a 0.320 hitter or a 0.220 hitter predicts only
1.4 percent of the variance explained for a single at-bat producing either a hit or no-hit). Some
discussion of this appears in Kang & Lane, supra note 2, at 489.
111. We acknowledge that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), made it much more
difficult to certi& large classes in employment discrimination cases. See id. at 2553-54 (holding that
statistical evidence of gender disparities combined with a sociologist's analysis that Wal-Mart's
corporate culture made it vulnerable to gender bias was inadequate to show that members of the
108.

putative class had a common claim for purposes of class certification under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)).

112. For example, in a Title VII cause of action for disparate treatment, the plaintiff must demonstrate an
adverse employment action "because of' the plaintiffs "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). By contrast, in a Title VII cause of action for disparate impact, the
plaintiff challenges facially neutral policies that produce a disparate impact on protected populations. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). We recognize that employment discrimination
law is far more complex than presented here, with different elements for different state and federal
causes of action.
113. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) process is critical in practical
terms because the failure to file a claim with the EEOC within the quite short statute of limitations
(either 180 or 300 days depending on whether the jurisdiction has a state or local fair employment
agency) or to timely file suit after resorting to the EEOC results in an automatic dismissal of the
claim. However, neither EEOC inaction nor an adverse determination preclude private suit. See 2
CHARLES SULLIVAN & LAUREN WALTER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 12.03[B], at 672 (4th ed. 2012).
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stages,114 implicit biases could potentially influence the outcome. To maintain a
manageable scope of analysis, we focus on employer discrimination, pretrial adjudication, and jury verdict.
1. Employer Discrimination
For many, the most interesting question is whether implicit bias helped
cause the employer to discriminate against the plaintiff There are good reasons
to think that some negative employment actions are indeed caused by implicit
biases in what tort scholars call a "but-for" sense. This but-for causation may be
legally sufficient since Title VII and most state antidiscrimination statutes require
only a showing that the plaintiff was treated less favorably "because of' a protected
characteristic, such as race or sex."s But our objective here is not to engage the doctrinall" and philosophical questions"' of whether existing antidiscrimination laws
do or should recognize implicit bias-actuated discrimination. We also do not
address what sorts of evidence should be deemed admissible when plaintiffs attempt
to make such a case at trial." Although those questions are critically important, our

114. As explained when we introduced the Criminal Path, the number of stages identified is somewhat
arbitrary. We could have listed more or fewer stages.
115. Section 703(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to fiil or refbise to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual.... because of [an] individuafs race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
116. For discussion of legal implications, see Faigman, Dasgupta & Ridgeway, supra note 19; Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias App roach to DiscriminationandEqual
Employment Opporunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 2.
117. For a philosophical analysis, see Patrick S. Shin, Liabilityfor Unconscious Discrimination?A Thought
Experiment in the Theory ofEmployment DiscriminationLaw, 62 HASTINGS LJ. 67 (2010).
118. For example, there is considerable disagreement on whether an expert should be allowed to testify that
a particular case is an instance of implicit bias. This issue is part of a much larger debate regarding

scientists' ability to make reasonable inferences about an individual case from group data. John
Monahan and Laurens Walker first pointed out that scientific evidence often comes to court at two
different levels of generality, one general and one specific. See Laurens Walker &John Monahan,
Social Frameworks:A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987). For instance,
in a case involving the accuracy of an eyewitness identification, the general question might concern
whether eyewitness identifications that are cross-racial are less reliable than same-race identifications; the specific question in the case would involve whether the cross-racial identification in
this case was accurate. Interested in social science evidence, Monahan and Walker referred to this
as "social framework" evidence, though their fundamental insight regarding frameworks applies to all
scientific evidence. In the context of implicit biases, then, general research amply demonstrates the
phenomenon in the population. However, in the courtroom, the issue typically concerns whether a
particular decision or action was a product of implicit bias.
As a scientific matter, knowing that a phenomenon exists in a population does not necessarily
mean that a scientist can reliably say that it was manifest ini a particular case. This has led to a debate as to
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task is more limited-to give an empirical account of how implicit bias may
potentially influence a civil litigation trajectory.
Our belief that implicit bias causes some employment discrimination is based
on the following evidence. First, tester studies in the field-which involve sending
identical applicants or applications except for some trait, such as race or genderhave generally uncovered discrimination. According to a summary by Mark Bendick
and Ana Nunes, there have been "several dozen testing studies" in the past two
decades, in multiple countries, focusing on discrimination against various
demographic groups (including women, the elderly, and racial minorities)." 9
These studies consistently reveal typical "net rates of discrimination" that range
from 20-40 percent.120 In other words, in 20-40 percent of cases, employers treat
subordinated groups (for example, racial minorities) worse than privileged groups
(for example, Whites) even though the testers were carefully controlled to be identically qualified.
Second, although tester studies do not distinguish between explicit versus
implicit bias, various laboratory experiments have found implicit bias correlations
with discriminatory evaluations. For example, Laurie Rudman and Peter Glick
demonstrated that in certain job conditions, participants treated a self-promoting
and competent woman, whom the researchers termed "agentic," worse than an

whether experts should be limited to testifying only to the general phenomenon or should be allowed
to opine on whether a particular case is an instance of the general phenomenon. This is a
complicated issue and scholars have weighed in on both sides. For opposition to the use of expert
testimony that a specific case is an instance of implicit bias, see Faigman, Dasgupta & Ridgeway,
supra note 19, at 1394 ('The research. . . does not demonstrate that an expert can validly determine
whether implicit bias caused a specific employment decision."); and John Monahan, Laurens Walker
& Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of "Social
Frameworks," 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1719 (2008) ("[Testimony] in which the expert witness explicitly
linked general research findings on gender discrimination to specific factual conclusions . . . exceeded

the limitations on expert testimony established by the Federal Rules of Evidence and by both the
original and revised proposal of what constitutes 'social framework' evidence."). For advancement
of allowing expert testimony that a particular case is an instance of some general phenomenon, see
Susan T. Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Standards/or Using Social PsychologicalEvidence in Employment
DiscriminationProceedings, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 867, 876 (2011) ("Qualified social scientists who
provide general, relevant knowledge and apply ordinary scientific reasoning may offer informal
opinion about the individual case, but probabilistically.").
In the end, lawyers may be able to work around this dispute by using an expert to provide social
framework evidence that identifies particular attributes that exacerbate biased decisionmaking, then
immediately calling up another witness who is personally familiar with the defendanfts work environment and asking that witness whether each of those particular attributes exists.
119. See Marc BendickyJr. &Ana P. Nunes, Developing the Research Basis for Controlling Bias in Hiring, 68J.
Soc.ISSUES (frthcomng2012), a-abeathttp!//www.bendickegan.mmpdf/Sent toJSJFeb_27_2010.pdf
120. Id (manuscript at 15).
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equally agentic man. 121 When the job description explicitly required the employee
to be cooperative and to work well with others, participants rated the agentic female
less hirable than the equally agentic male.122 Probing deeper, the researchers
identified that the participants penalized the female candidate for lack of social
skills, not incompetence.123 Explicit bias measures did not correlate with the
rankings; however, an implicit gender stereotype (associating women as more
communal than agentic)124 did correlate negatively with the ratings for social skills.
In other words, the higher the implicit gender stereotype, the lower the social
skills evaluation.125
Third, field experiments have provided further confirmation under realworld conditions. The studies by Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan
demonstrating discrimination in callbacks because of the names on comparable
resumes have received substantial attention in the popular press as well as in law
reviews.126 These studies found that for equally qualified-indeed, otherwise identical candidates, firms called back "Emily" more often than "Lakisha."12 Less
attention has been paid to Dan-Olof Rooth's extensions of this work, which
found similar callback discrimination but also found correlations between implicit
stereotypes and the discriminatory behavior.128 Rooth has found these correlations

121. Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash Toward Agentic
Women, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES 743, 757 (2001). Agentic qualities were signaled by a life philosophy
essay and canned answers to a videotaped interview that emphasized self-promotion and competence.
See id. at 748. Agentic candidates were contrasted with candidates whom the researchers labeled
"androgynous"-they also demonstrated the characteristics of interdependence and cooperation. Id
122. The difference was M=2.84 versus M= 3.52 on a5 point scale (p<0.0 5 ). See id at 753. No gender
bias was shown when the job description was ostensibly masculine and did not call for cooperative
behavior. Also, job candidates that were engineered to be androgynous-in other words, to show both
agentic and cooperative traits-were treated the same regardless of gender. See id.
123. See id. at 753-54.
124. The agentic stereotype was captured by word stimuli such as "independent," "autonomous," and
"competitive." The communal stereotype was captured by words such as "communal," "cooperative,"
and "kinship." See id at 750.
125. See id. at 756 (r-0.49, p<0.001). For further description of the study in the law reviews, see Kang,
supranote 46, at 1517-18.
126. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha
andJamalAFieldExperimenton Labor Market Discrimination,94 AM. ECON. REv. 991 (2004). A
search of the TP-ALL database in Westlaw on December 10, 2011 revealed ninety-six hits.
127. Id. at 992.
128. Dan-Olof Rooth, Automatic Associations and Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence, 17
LABOUR ECON. 523 (2010) (finding that implicit stereotypes, as measured by the IAT, predicted
differential callbacks of Swedish-named versus Arab-Muslim-named resumes). An increase of one
standard deviation in implicit stereotype produced almost a 12 percent decrease in the probability that
an Arab/Muslim candidate received an interview. See id
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with not only implicit stereotypes about ethnic groups (Swedes versus Arab-Muslims)
but also implicit stereotypes about the obese.' 29
Because implicit bias in the courtroom is our focus, we will not attempt to
offer a comprehensive summary of the scientific research as applied to the implicit
bias in the workplace.'30 We do, however, wish briefly to highlight lines of
research-variously called "constructed criteria," "shifting standards," or "casuistry"that emphasize the malleability of merit. We focus on this work because it has
received relatively little coverage in the legal literature and may help explain how
complex decisionmaking with multiple motivations occurs in the real world.' 3'
Moreover, this phenomenon may influence not only the defendant (accused of
discrimination) but also the jurors who are tasked to judge the merits of the
plaintiffs case.
Broadly speaking, this research demonstrates that people frequently engage in
motivated reasoningl3 in selection decisions that we justify by changing merit
criteria on the fly, often without conscious awareness. In other words, as between
two plausible candidates that have different strengths and weaknesses, we first choose
the candidate we like-a decision that may well be influenced by implicit factorsand then justify that choice by molding our merit standards accordingly.
We can make this point more concrete. In one experiment, Eric Luis
Uhlmann and Geoffrey Cohen asked participants to evaluate two finalists for
police chief-one male, the other female.' 33 One candidate's profile signaled book
smart, the other's profile signaled streetwise, and the experimental design varied
which profile attached to the woman and which to the man. Regardless of which
attributes the male candidate featured, participants favored the male candidate
and articulated their hiring criteria accordingly. For example, education (book

129. Jens Agerstrim & Dan-Olof Rooth, The Role of Automatic Obesity Stereotypes in Real Hiring
Discrimination, 96 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 790 (2011) (finding that hiring managers (N=153)
holding more negative IAT-measured automatic stereotypes about the obese were less likely to invite
an obese applicant for an interview).
130. Thankfully, many of these studies have already been imported into the legal literature. For a
review of the science, see Kang & Lane, supra note 2, at 484-85 (discussing evidence of racial bias in
how actual managers sort resumes and of correlations between implicit biases, as measured by the
TAT, and differential callback rates).
131. One recent exception is Rich, supra note 25.
132. For discussion of motivated reasoning in organizational contexts, see Sung Hui Kim, The Banality
of Fraud:Re-situating the Inside Counselas Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 983, 1029-34 (2005).
Motivated reasoning is "the process through which we assimilate information in a self-serving manner."
Id. at 1029.
133. See Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redening Merit to Justzy
Discrimination,16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474, 475 (2005).
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smarts) was considered more important when the man had it. 134 Surprisingly,
even the attribute of being family oriented and having children was deemed more
important when the man had it.' 35
Michael Norton, Joseph Vandello, and John Darley have made similar
findings, again in the domain of gender.' 6 Participants were put in the role of
manager of a construction company who had to hire a high-level employee. One
candidate's profile signaled more education; the other's profile signaled more
experience. Participants ranked these candidates (and three other filler candidates),
and then explained their decisionmaking by writing down "what was most
important in determining [their] decision." 3
In the control condition, the profiles were given with just initials (not full
names) and thus the test subjects could not assess their gender. In this condition,
participants preferred the higher educated candidate 76 percent of the time.' 38 In
the two experimental conditions, the profiles were given names that signaled
gender, with the man having higher education in one condition and the woman
having higher education in the other. When the man had higher education,
the participants preferred him 75 percent of the time. In sharp contrast, when the
woman had higher education, only 43 percent of the participants preferred her.139
The discrimination itself is not as interesting as how the discrimination
was justified. In the control condition and the man-has-more-education condition, the participants ranked education as more important than experience about
half the time (48 percent and 50 percent).14 0 By contrast, in the woman-has-moreeducation condition, only 22 percent ranked education as more important than
experience.141 In other words, what counted as merit was redefined, in real time,
to justify hiring the man.
Was this weighting done consciously, as part of a strategy to manipulate
merit in order to provide a cover story for decisionmaking caused and motivated by
explicit bias? Or, was merit refactored in a more automatic, unconscious, dissonancereducing rationalization, which would be more consistent with an implicit bias
story? Norton and colleagues probed this causation question in another series of

134. See id (M= 8.27 with educationversus M=7.07 without education, on a 11 point scale; p=0.006; d=1.02).
135. See id (M=6.21 with fanily traits versus 5.08 without family traits;p-0.05; d=0.86).
136. Michael I. Norton et al., Casuisty and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
817(2004).
137. Id.at820.
138. Id at 821.
139. Id
14 0. Id
14 1. Id
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experiments, in the context of race and college admissions.14 2 In a prior study, they
had found that Princeton undergraduate students shifted merit criteria-the relative
importance of GPA versus the number of AP classes taken-to select the Black
applicant over the White applicant who shared the same cumulative SAT score.14 3
To see whether this casuistry was explicit and strategic or implicit and automatic,
they ran another experiment in which participants merely rated admissions criteria
in the abstract without selecting a candidate for admission.
Participants were simply told that they were participating in a study
examining the criteria most important to college admissions decisions. They were
given two sample resumes to familiarize themselves with potential criteria. Both
resumes had equivalent cumulative SAT scores, but differed on GPA (4.0 versus
3.6) versus number of AP classes taken (9 versus 6). Both resumes also disclosed
the applicant's race. In one condition, the White candidate had the higher GPA
(and fewer AP classes); in the other condition, the African American candidate had
the higher GPA (and fewer AP classes). 44 After reviewing the samples, the partic
ipants had to rank order eight criteria in importance, including GPA, number of
AP classes, SAT scores, athletic participation, and so forth.
In the condition with the Black candidate having the higher GPA, 77 percent
of the participants ranked GPA higher in importance than number of AP classes
taken. By contrast, when the White candidate had the higher GPA, only 63
percent of the participants ranked GPA higher than AP classes. This change in
the weighting happened even though the participants did not expect that they
were going to make an admissions choice or to justify that choice. Thus, these
differences could not be readily explained in purely strategic terms, as methods for
justifying a subsequent decision. According to the authors,
[t]hese results suggest not only that it is possible for people to reweight
criteria deliberately to justify choices but also that decisions made under
such social constraints can impact information processing even prior
to making a choice. This suggests that the bias we observed is not
simply post hoc and strategic but occurs as an organic part of making
decisions when social category information is present.145

142. Michael I. Norton et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legitimate and Illegitimate
Criteiaon Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &L. 36, 42 (2006).
143. Id.at 44.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 46-47. This does not, however, filly establish that these differences were the result of implicit
views rather than explicit ones. Even if test subjects did not expect to have to make admissions
determinations, they might consciously select criteria that they believed favored one group over another.

HeinOnline -- 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1158 2011-2012

Implicit Bias in the Courtroom

1159

The ways that human decisionmakers may subtly adjust criteria in real time
to modify their judgments of merit has significance for thinking about the ways
that implicit bias may potentially influence employment decisions. In effect, bias
can influence decisions in ways contrary to the standard and seemingly commonsensical model. The conventional legal model describes behavior as a product
of discrete and identifiable motives. This research suggests, however, that implicit
motivations might influence behavior and that we then rationalize those decisions
after the fact. Hence, some employment decisions might be motivated by implicit
bias but rationalized post hoc based on nonbiased criteria. This process of reasoning
from behavior to motives, as opposed to the folk-psychology assumption that the
arrow of direction is from motives to behavior, is, in fact, consistent with a large body
of contemporary psychological research.14 6
2. Pretrial Adjudication: 12(b)(6)
As soon as a plaintiff files the complaint, the defendant will try to dismiss as
many of the claims in the complaint as possible. Before recent changes in pleading,
a motion to dismiss a complaint under FRCP 8 and FRCP 12(b)(6) was decided
under the relatively lax standard of Conley v. Gibson.147 Under Conley, all factual
allegations made in the complaint were assumed to be true. As such, the court's
task was simply to ask whether "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim."' 48
Starting with Be//At/antic Corp. v. Twombly,' 4 9 which addressed complex
antitrust claims of parallel conduct, and further developed in Ashcroft v. [qbal,'
which addressed civil rights actions based on racial and religious discrimination
post-9/11, the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the Conley standard. First, district
courts must now throw out factual allegations made in the complaint if they are
merely conclusory.s' Second, courts must decide on the plausibility of the claim
based on the information before them.1' In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that

146. See generallyTIVIOTHY D. WWLSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE
UNCONSCIOUS (2002).

147. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
148. Id. at 45-46.
149. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

150. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
151. Id. atl191.
152. Id.atl1950-52.
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because of an "obvious alternative explanation" 53 of earnest national security response,
purposeful racial or religious "discrimination is not a plausible conclusion."' 54
How are courts supposed to decide what is "Twom-bal"'s plausible when the
motion to dismiss happens before discovery, especially in civil rights cases in which
the defendant holds the key information? According to the Court, "[d]etermining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense."156
And when judges turn to their judicial experience and common sense, what
will this store of knowledge tell them about whether some particular comment or
act happened and whether such behavior evidences legally cognizable discrimination?
Decades of social psychological research demonstrate that our impressions are
driven by the interplay between categorical (general to the category) and individuating (specific to the member of the category) information. For example, in
order to come to an impression about a Latina plaintiff, we reconcile general
schemas for Latina workers with individualized data about the specific plaintiff.
When we lack sufficient individuating information-which is largely the state of
affairs at the motion to dismiss stage-we have no choice but to rely more heavily
on our schemas.' 57
Moreover, consider what the directive to rely on common sense means in
light of social judgeability theory.'ss According to this theory, there are social rules
that tell us when it is appropriate to judge someone. For example, suppose your
fourth grade child told you that a new kid, Hannah, has enrolled in school and that
she receives free lunches. Your child then asks you whether you think she is smart.
You will probably decline to answer since you do not feel entitled to make that
judgment. Without more probative information, you feel that you would only be
crudely stereotyping her abilities based on her socioeconomic status. But what if
the next day you volunteered in the classroom and spent twelve minutes observing

153. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544) (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id.at 1952.
155. See In reIowa Ready-Mix Concrete Antitrust Litig., No. C 10-4038-MWB, 2011 WL 5547159, at
*1 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 9, 2011) (referring to a Twombly-Iqbalmotion as "Twom-bal").
156. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940.
157. These schemas also reflect cultural cognitions. See generally Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and
the Reasonable Person, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1455 (2010); Dan M. Kahan, David A.
Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Peri of
Cognitivelliberalism,122 HAR. L. REV. 837 (2009).
158. See Vincent Y. Yzerbyt et al., SocialJudgeability:The Impact ofMetaInformationalCues on the Use qf
Stereotypes, 66 J. PERSONALITY &Soc. PSYCHOL. 48 (1994).
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Hannah interacting with a teacher trying to solve problems? Would you then feel
that you had enough individuating information to come to some judgment?
This is precisely what John Darley and Paget Gross tested in a seminal
experiment in 1983.159 When participants only received economic status information, they declined to evaluate Hannah's intelligence as a function of her economic class. However, when they saw a twelve-minute videotape of the child
answering a battery of questions, participants felt credentialed to judge the girl,
and they did so in a way that was consistent with stereotypes. What they did not
realize was that the individuating information in the videotape was purposefully
designed to be ambiguous. So participants who were told that Hannah was rich
interpreted the video as confirmation that she was smart. By contrast, participants
who were told that Hannah was poor interpreted the same video as confirmation
that she was not so bright.' 0
Vincent Yzerbyt and colleagues, who call this phenomenon "social
If researchers told
judgeability," have produced further evidence of this effect.'
you that a person is either an archivist or a comedian and then asked you twenty
questions about this person regarding their degree of extroversion with the
options of 'True," "False," or "I don't know," how might you answer? What if, in
addition, they manufactured an illusion that you were given individuating
information-information about the specific individual and not just the category
he or she belongs to-even though you actually did not receive any such information?' 62 This is precisely what Yzerbyt and colleagues did in the lab.
They found that those operating under the illusion of individuating information were more confident in their answers in that they marked fewer questions
with "I don't know."163 They also found that those operating under the illusion
gave more stereotype-consistent answers.' 64 In other words, the illusion of being
informed made the target judgeable. Because the participants, in fact, had received
no such individuating information, they tended to judge the person in accordance
with their schemas about archivists and comedians. Interestingly, "in the debriefings,
159. See John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 22-23 (1983).
160. See id. at 24-25, 27-29.
161. See Yzerbyt et al., supranote 158.
162. This illusion was created by having participants go through a listening exercise, in which they were told
to focus only on one speaker (coming through one ear of a headset) and ignore the other (coming
through the other). They were later told that the speaker that they were told to ignore had in fact
provided relevant individuating information. The truth was, however, that no such information had
been given. See id. at 50.
163. Seeid at1 (M=5.07 versus l.13;p<.003).
164. See id (M= 9.97 versus 6.30, out of 1 to 20 point range; p<0.006).
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subjects reported that they did not judge the target on the basis of a stereotype;
they were persuaded that they had described a real person qua person."165 Again,
it is possible that they were concealing their explicitly embraced bias about
archivists and comedians from probing researchers, but we think that it is more
probable that implicit bias explains these results.
Social judgeability theory connects back to Iqbal in that the Supreme
Court has altered the rules structuring the judgeability of plaintiffs and their
complaints. Under Conley, judges were told not to judge without the facts and
thus were supposed to allow the lawsuit to get to discovery unless no set of facts
could state a legal claim. By contrast, under Iqbal, judges have been explicitly
green-lighted to judge the plausibility of the plaintiffs claim based only on the
minimal facts that can be alleged before discovery-and this instruction came in
the context of a racial discrimination case. In other words, our highest court has
entitled district court judges to make this judgment based on a quantum of information that may provide enough facts to render the claim socially judgeable but
not enough facts to ground that judgment in much more than the judge's schemas.
Just as Yzerbyt's illusion of individuating information entitled participants to judge
in the laboratory, the express command of the Supreme Court may entitle
judges to judge in the courtroom when they lack any well-developed basis to do so.
There are no field studies to test whether biases, explicit or implicit, influence how actual judges decide motions to dismiss actual cases. It is not clear
that researchers could ever collect such information. All that we have are some
preliminary data about dismissal rates before and after Iqbal that are consistent
with our analysis. Again, since Iqbal made dismissals easier, we should see an
increase in dismissal rates across the board.' 66 More relevant to our hypothesis
is whether certain types of cases experienced differential changes in dismissal rates.
For instance, we would expect Iqbal to generate greater increases in dismissal
rates for race discrimination claims than, say, contract claims. There are a
number of potential reasons for this: One reason is that judges are likely to have
stronger biases that plaintiffs in the former type of case have less valid claims
than those in the latter. Another reason is that we might expect some kinds of cases

165. Id
166. In the first empirical study oflIqbal, Hatamyar sampled 444 cases under Conley (from May 2005 to
May 2007) and 173 cases under Iqbal (from May 2009 to August 2009). See Patricia W. Hatamyar,
The Tao fPleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal MatterEmpincally, 59 Am. U. L. REv. 553, 597 (2010).
She found that the general rate of complaint dismissal rose from 46 percent to 56 percent. See id at 602
tbl.2. However, this finding was not statistically significant under a Pearson chi-squared distribution test
examnnrg the different dismissal rates for Conly, Twombly, and Ibal for three results: grant, mixed,
and deny.
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to raise more significant concerns about asymmetric information than do others.
In contracts disputes, both parties may have good information about most of the relevant facts even prior to discovery. In employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs
may have good hunches about how they have been discriminated against, but
prior to discovery they may not have access to the broad array of information in the
employer's possession that may be necessary to turn the hunch into something a
judge finds plausible. Moreover, these two reasons potentially interact: the more
gap filling and inferential thinking that a judge has to engage in, the more room
there may be for explicit and implicit biases to structure the judge's assessment in
the absence of a well-developed evidentiary record.
Notwithstanding the lack of field studies on these issues, there is some evidentiary support for these differential changes in dismissal rates. For example,
Patricia Hatamayr sorted a sample of cases before and after Iqbalinto six major
categories: contracts, torts, civil rights, labor, intellectual property, and all other
statutory cases.' 6 She found that in contract cases, the rate of dismissal did not
change much from Conley (32 percent) to Iqbal (32 percent).1 6 8 By contrast, for
Title VII cases, the rate of dismissal increased from 42 percent to 53 percent.169
Victor Quintanilla has collected more granular data by counting not Title VII cases
generally but federal employment discrimination cases filed specifically by Black
70
plaintiffs both before and after Iqbal.1
He found an even larger jump. Under the
Conley regime, courts granted only 20.5 percent of the motions to dismiss such
cases. By contrast, under the Iqbal regime, courts granted 54.6 percent of them.' 7 '
These data lend themselves to multiple interpretations and suffer from various
confounds. So at this point, we can make only modest claims. We merely suggest
that the dismissal rate data are consistent with our hypothesis that Iqbals plausibility standard poses a risk of increasing the impact of implicit biases at the
12(b)(6) stage.
If, notwithstanding the plausibility-based pleading requirements, the case gets
past the motion to dismiss, then discovery will take place, after which defendants
will seek summary judgment under FRCP 56. On the one hand, this procedural posture is less subject to implicit biases than the motion to dismiss because
more individuating information will have surfaced through discovery. On the
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id.at 591-93.
See id. at 630 tbl.D.
See id.
See Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense:A SocialPychologicalStudy oflqbalk Effect on Claims
ofRace Discrimination, 17 MICH.J. RACE & L. 1 (2011). Quintanilla counted both Tide VII and 42

U.S.C. § 1981 cases.

171. Seecid. at 36 tbl.1 (p<0.000).
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other hand, the judge still has to make a judgment call on whether any "genuine
dispute as to any material fact"' 72 remains. Similar decisionmaking dynamics are
likely to be in play as we saw in the pleading stage, for a significant quantum of
discretion remains. Certainly the empirical evidence that demonstrates how poorly
employment discrimination claims fare on summary judgment is not inconsistent
with this view, though, to be sure, myriad other explanations of these differences
are possible (including, for example, doctrinal obstacles to reaching a jury).173
3. Jury Verdict
If the case gets to trial, the parties will introduce evidence on the merits of the
claim. Sometimes the evidence will be physical objects, such as documents, emails,
photographs, voice recordings, evaluation forms, and the like. The rest of it will
be witness or expert testimony, teased out and challenged by lawyers on both
sides. Is there any reason to think that jurors might interpret the evidence in line
with their biases? In the criminal trajectory, we already learned of juror bias via
meta-analyses as well as correlations with implicit biases. Unfortunately, we lack
comparable studies in the civil context. What we offer are two sets of related arguments and evidence that speak to the issue: motivation to shift standards and
performer preference.
a. Motivation to Shift Standards
Above, we discussed the potential malleability of merit determinations when
judgments permit discretion and reviewed how employer defendants might shift
standards and reweight criteria when evaluating applicants and employees. Here,
we want to recognize that a parallel phenomenon may affect juror decisionmaking.
Suppose that a particular juror is White and that he identifies strongly with his
Whiteness. Suppose further that the defendant is White and is being sued by a
racial minority. The accusation of illegal and immoral behavior threatens the

172. FED R. Civ. P. 56(a).
173. See,e.g., Charlotte L. Lanvers, Dfferent FederalCourt, Different DispositionAn EmpiricalCompanson
ofADA, Title VH Race and Sex, andADEA Employment Discrimination Dispositions in the Eastern
District ofPennsylvania and the Northern Distict ofGeorgia, 16 CORNELL J.L. &POLY 381, 395
(2007); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates Over Time, Across
Case Categories, andAcross Distrcts:An EmpiricalStudy of Three Large Federal Distrcts (Cornell Law
Sch. Research Paper No. 08-022, 2008), available at http://ssrn.corn/abstract=1138373 (finding that
civil rights cases, and particularly ernploymrent discrimination cases, have a consistently higher sur ay
judgment rate than non-civil rights cases).
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status of the juror's racial ingroup. Anca Miron, Nyla Branscombe, and Monica
Biernat have demonstrated that this threat to the ingroup can motivate people to
shift standards in a direction that shields the ingroup from ethical responsibility.174
Miron and colleagues asked White undergraduates at the University of Kansas
to state how strongly they identified with America.17s Then they were asked
various questions about America's relationship to slavery and its aftermath. These
questions clumped into three categories (or constructs): judgments of harm done to
Blacks,' 76 standards of injustice,' 77 and collective guilt.1' Having measured these
various constructs, the researchers looked for relationships among them. Their
hypothesis was that the greater the self-identification with America, the higher
the standards would be before being willing to call America racist or otherwise morally blameworthy (that is, the participants would set higher confirmatory standards).
They found that White students who strongly identified as American set higher
standards for injustice (that is, they wanted more evidence before calling America
unjust);"' they thought less harm was done by slavery;1 so and, as a result, they
felt less collective guilt compared to other White students who identified less
with America.'"' In other words, their attitudes toward America were correlated
with the quantum of evidence they required to reach a judgment that America had
been unjust.
In a subsequent study, Miron et al. tried to find evidence of causation, not
merely correlation. They did so by experimentally manipulating national identification by asking participants to recount situations in which they felt similar to
other Americans (evoking greater identification with fellow Americans) or different
from other Americans (evoking less identification with fellow Americans).182

174. Anca M. Miron, Nyla R. Branscombe &Monica Biernat, Motivated Shifting offustice Standards, 36
PERSONALITY Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 768, 769 (2010).
175. The participants were all American citizens. The question asked was, "I feel strong ties with other
Americans." Id.
at 771.
176. A representative question was, "How much damage did Americans cause to Africans?" on a "very
little" (1) to "very much" (7) Likert scale. Id.at 770.
177. "Please indicate what percentage of Americans would have had to be involved in causing harm to
Africans for you to consider the past United States a racist nation" on a scale of 0-10 percent, 10-25
percent, up to 90-100 percent. Id at 771.
178. "I feel guilty for my nation's harmful past actions toward African Americans" on a "strongly disagree"
(1) to "strongly agree" (9) Likert scale. Id.
179. See id. at 772 tbl.I (r-0.26,p<0.05).
180. See id. (r--0.23,p<0.05).
181. See id. (r-0.21,p<0.05). Using structural equation modeling, the researchers found that standards of
injustice fully mediated the relationship between group identification and judgments of harm;
also, judgments of harm fuilly mediated the effect of standards on collective guilt. See id at 772-73.
182. The manipulation was successful. See id at 773 (p<0.05, d=0.54.).
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Those who were experimentally made to feel less identification with America
subsequently reported very different standards of justice and collective guilt
compared to others made to feel more identification with America. Specifically,
participants in the low identification condition set lower standards for calling
something unjust, they evaluated slavery's harms as higher, and they felt more
collective guilt. By contrast, participants in the high identification condition set
higher standards for calling something unjust (that is, they required more
evidence), they evaluated slavery's harms as less severe, and they felt less guilt.'83 In
other words, by experimentally manipulating how much people identified with
their ingroup (in this case, American), researchers could shift the justice standard
that participants deployed to judge their own ingroup for harming the outgroup.
Evidentiary standards for jurors are specifically articulated (for example,
"preponderance of the evidence") but substantively vague. The question is how
a juror operationalizes that standard-just how much evidence does she require for
believing that this standard has been met? These studies show how our assessments
of evidence-of how much is enough-are themselves potentially malleable. One
potential source of malleability is, according to this research, a desire (most likely
implicit) to protect one's ingroup status. If a juror strongly identifies with the
defendant employer as part of the same ingroup-racially or otherwise-the juror
may shift standards of proof upwards in response to attack by an outgroup plaintiff
In other words, jurors who implicitly perceive an ingroup threat may require more
evidence to be convinced of the defendant's harmful behavior than they would in
an otherwise identical case that did not relate to their own ingroup. Ingroup
threat is simply an example of this phenomenon; the point is that implicit biases
may influence jurors by affecting how they implement ambiguous decision criteria
regarding both the quantum of proof and how they make inferences from ambiguous pieces of information.
b. Performer Preference
Jurors will often receive evidence and interpretive cues from performers at
trial, by which we mean the cast of characters in the courtroom who jurors see, such
as the judge, lawyers, parties, and witnesses. These various performers are playing
roles of one sort or another. And, it turns out that people tend to have stereotypes
about the ideal employee or worker that vary depending on the segment of the labor

183. In standards for injustice, M=2.60 versus 3.39; on judgments of harm, M=5.82 versus 5.42; on
collective guilt, M= 6.33 versus 4.60. All differences were statistically significant atp-0.05 or less. Seeid!.
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market. For example, in high-level professional jobs and leadership roles, the
supposedly ideal employee is often a White man. 84 When the actual performer
does not fit the ideal type, people may evaluate the performance more negatively.
One study by Jerry Kang, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Kumar Yogeeswaran, and
Gary Blasi found just such performer preference with respect to lawyers, as a function of race.'
Kang and colleagues measured the explicit and implicit beliefs about
the ideal lawyer held by jury-eligible participants from Los Angeles. The
researchers were especially curious whether participants had implicit stereotypes
linking the ideal litigator with particular racial groups (White versus Asian
American). In addition to measuring their biases, the researchers had participants
evaluate two depositions, which they heard via headphones and simultaneously
read on screen. At the beginning of each deposition, participants were shown for
five seconds a picture of the litigator conducting the deposition on a computer
screen accompanied by his name. The race of the litigator was varied by name and
photograph. Also, the deposition transcript identified who was speaking, which
meant that participants repeatedly saw the attorneys' last names. 8 6
The study discovered the existence of a moderately strong implicit stereotype associating litigators with Whiteness (IAT D=0.45);"' this stereotype
correlated with more favorable evaluations of the White lawyer (ingroup favoritism
since 91% of the participants were White) in terms of his competence (r=0.32,
p<0.01), likeability (r=0.31, p<0.01), and hireability (r=0.26, p<0.0 5 )."' These
results were confirmed through hierarchical regressions. To appreciate the magnitude of the effect sizes, imagine a juror who has no explicit stereotype but a large
implicit stereotype (IAT D=1) that the ideal litigator is White. On a 7-point
scale, this juror would favor a White lawyer over an identical Asian American

184. See,e.g., Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congmity Theory ofPrejudice
Toward Female Leaders,
109 PSYCHOL. REv. 573 (2002); Alice H. Eagly, Steven J. Karau &Mona G. Makhijani, Gender and
the Effectiveness qfLeaders:A Meta-Analysis, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 125 (1995); see also
JOAN WILLIAMS,
UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT
213-17 (2000) (discussing how conceptions of merit are designed around masculine norms); Shelley
J. Correll et al., Getting aJob:IA There aMotherhoodPenalty, 112 AM.J. SOC. 1297 (2007).
185. See Jerry Kang et al., Are IdealLitigators White? Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRiCAL
LEGAL STUD. 886 (2010).
186. See id. at 892-99 (describing method and procedure, and identifyng attorney names as 'William Cole
or "Sung Chang").
at 900. They also found strong negative implicit attitudes against Asian Americans (IAT
187. See id.
D=0.62). See id
188. Id at 901 tbl.3.
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lawyer 6.01 to 5.65 in terms of competence, 5.57 to 5.27 in terms of likability, and
5.65 to 4.92 in terms of hireability.'
This study provides some evidence that potential jurors' implicit stereotypes
cause racial discrimination in judging attorney performance of basic depositions.
What does this have to do with how juries might decide employment discrimination cases? Of course, minority defendants do not necessarily hire minority
attorneys. That said, it is possible that minorities do hire minority attorneys at
somewhat higher rates than nonminorities. But even more important, we hypothesize that similar processes might take place with how jurors evaluate not only
attorneys but also both parties and witnesses, as they perform their various roles at
trial. To be sure, this study does not speak directly to credibility assessments, likely
to be of special import at trial, but it does at least suggest that implicit stereotypes
may affect judgment of performances in the courtroom.
We concede that our claims about implicit bias influencing jury
decisionmaking in civil cases are somewhat speculative and not well quantified.
Moreover, in the real world, certain institutional processes may make both explicit
and implicit biases less likely to translate into behavior. For example, jurors must
deliberate with other jurors, and sometimes the jury features significant demographic
diversity, which seems to deepen certain types of deliberation. 90 Jurors also feel
accountable'91 to the judge, who reminds them to adhere to the law and the merits.
That said, for reasons already discussed, it seems implausible to think that current
practices within the courtroom somehow magically burn away all jury biases,
especially implicit biases of which jurors and judges are unaware. That is why we
seek improvements based on the best understanding of how people actually behave.
Thus far, we have canvassed much of the available evidence describing how
implicit bias may influence decisionmaking processes in both criminal and civil
cases. On the one hand, the research findings are substantial and robust. On the
other hand, they provide only imperfect knowledge, especially about what is
actually happening in the real world. Notwithstanding this provisional and limited knowledge, we strongly believe that these studies, in aggregate, suggest that
implicit bias in the trial process is a problem worth worrying about. What, then,
can be done? Based on what we know, how might we intervene to improve the
trial process and potentially vaccinate decisionmakers against, or at least reduce,
the influence of implicit bias?

189. These figures were calculated using the regression equations in id. at 902 n.25, 904 n.27.
190. See infra text accompanying notes 241-245.
191. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 267-70 (1999).
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III.

INTERVENTIONS

Before we turn explicitly to interventions, we reiterate that there are many
causes of unfairness in the courtroom, and our focus on implicit bias is not meant
to deny other causes. In Part II, we laid out the empirical case for why we believe
that implicit biases influence both criminal and civil case trajectories. We now
identify interventions that build on an overlapping scientific and political consensus.
If there are cost-effective interventions that are likely to decrease the impact of
implicit bias in the courtroom, we believe they should be adopted at least as forms
of experimentation.
We are mindful of potential costs, including implementation and even
overcorrection costs. But we are hopeful that these costs can be safely minimized.
Moreover, the potential benefits of these improvements are both substantive and
expressive. Substantively, the improvements may increase actual fairness by decreasing the impact of implicit biases; expressively, they may increase the appearance of
fairness by signaling the judiciary's thoughtful attempts to go beyond cosmetic
compliance.192 Effort is not always sufficient, but it ought to count for something.
A.

Decrease the Implicit Bias

If implicit bias causes unfairness, one intervention strategy is to decrease the
implicit bias itself It would be delightful if explicit refutation would suffice. But
abstract, global self-commands to "Be fair!" do not much change implicit social
cognitions. How then might we alter implicit attitudes or stereotypes about various social groups?' 93 One potentially effective strategy is to expose ourselves to
countertypical associations. In rough terms, if we have a negative attitude toward
some group, we need exposure to members of that group to whom we would have
a positive attitude. If we have a particular stereotype about some group, we need
exposure to members of that group that do not feature those particular attributes.

192. In a 1999 survey by the National Center for State Courts, 47 percent of the American people
doubted that African Americans and Latinos receive equal treatment in state courts; 55 percent doubted
that non-English speaking people receive equal treatment. The appearance of fairness is a serious
problem. See NAtL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, How THE PUBLic VIEWS THE STATE COURTS:
A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 37 (1999), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/
ResAmtPTCPublicViewCrtsPub.pdf The term "cosmetic compliance" comes from Kimberly
D. Krawiec, Cosmetic ComplianceandtheFailure(NegotiatedGovmane,
81 WASH. U. L.Q487 (2003).
193. For analysis of the nature versus nurture debate regarding implicit biases, see Jerry Kang, Bits ofBias,
in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAs ACROSS THE LAW 132 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).
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These exposures can come through direct contact with countertypical people.
For example, Nilanjana Dasgupta and Shaki Asgari tracked the implicit gender
stereotypes held by female subjects both before and after a year of attending
college. 194 One group of women attended a year of coed college; the other group
attended a single-sex college. At the start of their college careers, the two groups had
comparable amounts of implicit stereotypes against women. However, one year
later, those who attended the women's college on average expressed no gender
bias, whereas the average bias of those who attended the coed school increased.1 95
By carefully examining differences in the two universities' environments, the
researchers learned that it was exposure to countertypical women in the role of
professors and university administrators that altered the implicit gender stereotypes of female college students. 1 96
Nilanjana Dasgupta and Luis Rivera also found correlations between participants' self-reported numbers of gay friends and their negative implicit attitudes
toward gays."' Such evidence gives further reason to encourage intergroup social
contact by diversifying the bench, the courtroom (staff and law clerks), our
residential neighborhoods, and friendship circles. That said, any serious diversification of the bench, the bar, and staff would take enormous resources, both
economic and political. Moreover, these interventions might produce only modest
results. For instance, Rachlinski et al. found that judges from an eastern district that
featured approximately half White judges and half Black judges had "only slightly
smaller" implicit biases than the judges of a western jurisdiction, which contained
only two Black judges (out of forty-five total district court judges, thirty-six of them
being White).' 98 In addition, debiasing exposures would have to compete against the
other daily real-life exposures in the courtroom that rebias. For instance, Joshua
Correll found that police officers who worked in areas with high minority
demographics and violent crime showed more shooter bias.'"
If increasing direct contact with a diverse but countertypical population is
not readily feasible, what about vicarious contact, which is mediated by images,

194. See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to Counterstereotypic Women
Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability qfAutomatic Gender Stereotyping, 40J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc.
PSYCHOL. 642, 649-54 (2004).
195. See id.at 651.
196. See id. at 651-53.
197. See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, From Automatic Antigay Prejudice to Behavior: The
ModeratingRole of ConsciousBeif About Gender and Behavioral Control, 91 J.PERSONALITY& SOC.
PSYCHOL. 268, 270 (2006).
198. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 86, at 1227.
199. See Correll et al, supra note 51, at 1014 ("We tentatively suggest that these environments may
reinforce cultural stereotypes, linking Black people to the concept of violence.").
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videos, simulations, or even imagination and which does not require direct faceto-face contact?200 Actually, the earliest studies on the malleability of implicit
bias pursued just these strategies. For instance, Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony
Greenwald showed that participants who were exposed vicariously to countertypical
exemplars in a history questionnaire (for example, Black figures to whom we
tend to have positive attitudes, such as Martin Luther King Jr., and White figures to
whom we tend to have negative attitudes, such as Charles Manson) showed a
substantial decrease in negative implicit attitudes toward African Americans. 201 These
findings are consistent with work done by Irene Blair, who has demonstrated that
brief mental visualization exercises can also change scores on the IAT. 202
In addition to exposing people to famous countertypical exemplars, implicit
biases may be decreased by juxtaposing ordinary people with countertypical settings.
For instance, Bernard Wittenbrink, Charles Judd, and Bernadette Park examined
the effects of watching videos of African Americans situated either at a convivial
outdoor barbecue or at a gang-related incident. 0 3 Situating African Americans in
a positive setting produced lower implicit bias scores. 204
There are, to be sure, questions about whether this evidence directly translates into possible improvements for the courtroom. 20' But even granting numerous
caveats, might it not be valuable to engage in some experimentation? In chambers
and the courtroom buildings, photographs, posters, screen savers, pamphlets, and
decorations ought to be used that bring to mind countertypical exemplars or associations for participants in the trial process. Since judges and jurors are differently
situated, we can expect both different effects and implementation strategies.
For example, judges would be exposed to such vicarious displays regularly as a
feature of their workplace environment. By contrast, jurors would be exposed only

200. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1166-67 (2000) (comparing vicarious with
direct experiences).

201. Nilanjana Dasgupta &Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability ofAutomaticAttitudes: Combating
Automatic Prejudice With Images ofAdmired and DislikedIndividuals,81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 800, 807 (2001). The IAT effect changed nearly 50 percent as compared to the control
(IAT effect M=78ms versus 174ms, p=0.01) and remained for over twenty-four hours.
202. Irene V. Blair, Jennifer E. Ma &Alison P. Lenton, Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of
Implicit Stereotjpes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828 (2001). See
generally Irene V. Blair, The Malleability fAutomatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. REv. 242 (2002) (literature review).
203. See Bernd Wittenbrink et al., Spontaneous Prejudice in Context: Variability in Automatically Activated
Attitudes, 81 J. PERSONALITY &SOC. PSYCHOL. 815, 818-19 (2001).
204. Id at 819.
205. How long does the intervention last? How immediate does it have to be? How much were the
studies able to ensure focus on the positive countertypical stimulus as opposed to in a courtroom
where these positives would be amidst the myriad distractions of trial?
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during their typically brief visit to the court.206 Especially for jurors, then, the
goal is not anything as ambitious as fundamentally changing the underlying
structure of their mental associations. Instead, the hope would be that by reminding
them of countertypical associations, we might momentarily activate different mental
patterns while in the courthouse and reduce the impact of implicit biases on
their decisionmaking.207
To repeat, we recognize the limitations of our recommendation. Recent
research has found much smaller debiasing effects from vicarious exposure than
originally estimated.208 Moreover, such exposures must compete against the flood
of typical, schema-consistent exposures we are bombarded with from mass media.
That said, we see little costs to these strategies even if they appear cosmetic. There
is no evidence, for example, that these exposures will be so powerful that they will
overcorrect and produce net bias against Whites.
B.

Break the Link Between Bias and Behavior

Even if we cannot remove the bias, perhaps we can alter decisionmaking
processes so that these biases are less likely to translate into behavior. In order to
keep this Article's scope manageable, we focus on the two key players in the
courtroom: judges and jurors. 209
1.

Judges

a. Doubt One's Objectivity
Most judges view themselves as objective and especially talented at fair
decisionmaking. For instance, Rachlinski et al. found in one survey that 97
percent of judges (thirty-five out of thirty-six) believed that they were in the top
quartile in "avoid[ing] racial prejudice in decisionmaking"21 0 relative to other
judges attending the same conference. That is, obviously, mathematically impossible.

206. See Kang, supranote 46, at 1537 (raising the possibility of "debiasing booths" in lobbies for waiting jurors).
207. Rajees Sritharan & Bertram Gawronski, ChangingImplicit andEExplicit Prejudice:Insights From the
Associative-PropositionalEvaluationModel, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 118 (2010).
208. See Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba & Brian A. Nosek, The SurprisinglyLimited MalleabilityoflmplicitRacial
Evaluations, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 141 (2010) (finding an effect size that was approximately 70
percent smaller than the original Dasgupta and Greenwald findings, see supranote 201).
209. Other important players obviously include staff, lawyers, and police. For a discussion of the training
literature on the police and shooter bias, see Adam Benforado, Quick on the Draw:Implicit Bias and
the SecondAmendment, 89 OR. L. REV. 1, 46-48 (2010).
210. See Rachlinski et al, supra note 86, at 1225.
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(One is reminded of Lake Wobegon, where all of the children are above
average.) In another survey, 97.2 percent of those administrative agency judges
surveyed put themselves in the top half in terms of avoiding bias, again impossible.21 ' Unfortunately, there is evidence that believing ourselves to be objective puts
us at particular risk for behaving in ways that belie our self-conception.
Eric Uhlmann and Geoffrey Cohen have demonstrated that when a person
believes himself to be objective, such belief licenses him to act on his biases. In
one study, they had participants choose either the candidate profile labeled "Gary"
or the candidate profile labeled "Lisa" for the job of factory manager. Both candidate
profiles, comparable on all traits, unambiguously showed strong organization
skills but weak interpersonal skills. 212 Half the participants were primed to view
themselves as objective. 21' The other half were left alone as control.
Those in the control condition gave the male and female candidates statistically
indistinguishable hiring evaluations. 21 4 But those who were manipulated to think
of themselves as objective evaluated the male candidate higher (M=5.06 versus

3.75, p=0.0 3 9 , d=0.76). 21 ' Interestingly, this was not due to a malleability of merit
effect, in which the participants reweighted the importance of either organizational skills or interpersonal skills in order to favor the man. Instead, the discrimination was caused by straight-out disparate evaluation, in which the Gary profile was
rated as more interpersonally skilled than the Lisa profile by those primed to think
themselves objective (M=3.12 versus 1.94, p=0.0 2 3 , d=0.86). 21 6 In short, thinking
oneself to be objective seems ironically to lead one to be less objective and more
susceptible to biases. Judges should therefore remind themselves that they are
human and fallible, notwithstanding their status, their education, and the robe.
But is such a suggestion based on wishful thinking? Is there any evidence
that education and reminders can actually help? There is some suggestive evidence from Emily Pronin, who has carefully studied the bias blindspot-the belief

211. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &Andrew J. Wistrich, The "HiddenJudiciary":An Empirical
Examination ofExecutive BranchJustice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1519 (2009).
212. See Eric Luis Uhlmarnn & Geoffrey L. Cohen, "I Think It, Therefore It's True" Effects of Self-Perceived
Objectivityon HiringDiscrimination,104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Html. DECISION PROCESSES
207, 210-11 (2007).
213. This was done simply by asking participants to rate their own objectivity. Over 88 percent of the participants rated themselves as above average on objectivity. See id at 209. The participants were drawn
from a lay sample (not just college students).
214. See id. at 210-11 (M=3.24 for male candidate versus 4.05 for female candidate, p=0.21).
215. See id. at 211.
216. See id. Interestingly,
the gender of the participants mattered. Female participants did not show the
objectivity priming effect. See id.
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that others are biased but we ourselves are not.217 In one study, Emily Pronin and
Matthew Kugler had a control group of Princeton students read an article from
Nature about environmental pollution. By contrast, the treatment group read an
article allegedly published in Science that described various nonconscious influences on attitudes and behaviors.21 After reading an article, the participants were
asked about their own objectivity as compared to their university peers. Those in
the control group revealed the predictable bias blindspot and thought that they
suffered from less bias than their peers. 21' By contrast, those in the treatment group
did not believe that they were more objective than their peers; moreover, their
more modest self-assessments differed from those of the more confident control
group. 220 These results suggest that learning about nonconscious thought processes
can lead people to be more skeptical about their own objectivity.
b. Increase Motivation
Tightly connected to doubting one's objectivity is the strategy of increasing
one's motivation to be fair. 22' Social psychologists generally agree that motivation
is an important determinant of checking biased behavior.222 Specific to implicit bias,
Nilanjana Dasgupta and Luis Rivera found that participants who were consciously
motivated to be egalitarian did not allow their antigay implicit attitudes to
translate into biased behavior toward a gay person. By contrast, for those lacking
such motivation, strong antigay implicit attitudes predicted more biased behavior. 223
A powerful way to increase judicial motivation is for judges to gain actual
scientific knowledge about implicit social cognitions. In other words, judges
should be internally persuaded that a genuine problem exists. This education and

217. See generally Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception qf Bias in Human judgment, 11 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 37 (2007).
218. See Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The Introspection
Illusion as a Source qfthe Bias BlindSpot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 574 (2007). The
intervention article was 1643 words long, excluding references. See id. at 575.
219. See id. at 575 (M=5.29 where 6 represented the same amount of bias as peers).
220. See id. For the treatment group, their self-evaluation of objectivity was M=5.88, not statistically
significantly different from the score of 6, which, as noted previously, meant having the same amount
of bias as peers. Also, the self-reported objectivity of the treatment group (M=5.88) differed from the
control group (M=5.29) in a statistically significant way, p=0.01. See id.
221. For a review, see Margo J. Monteith et al., Schooling the Cognitive Monsiter: The Role ofMotivation in
the Regnlation and Control ofPrejudice, 3 SOC. &PERSONALITYPSYCHOL. COMPASS 211 (2009).
222. See Russell H. Fazio & Tamara Towles- Schwen, The MODE Model ofAttitude-Behavior Processes,
in DtAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 97 (Shelly Chaiken &Yaacov Trope
eds., 1999).
223. See Dasgupta & Rivera, supra note 197, at 275.
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awareness can be done through self-study as well as more official judicial education. Such education is already taking place, although mostly in an ad hoc fashion.224
The most organized intervention has come through the National Center for State
Courts (NCSC). The NCSC organized a three-state pilot project in California,
Minnesota, and North Dakota to teach judges and court staff about implicit bias. 225
It used a combination of written materials, videos, resource websites, Implicit
Association Tests, and online lectures from subject-matter experts to provide the
knowledge. Questionnaires completed before and after each educational intervention provided an indication of program effectiveness.
Although increased knowledge of the underlying science is a basic objective of
an implicit bias program, the goal is not to send judges back to college for a crash
course in Implicit Psychology 101. Rather, it is to persuade judges, on the merits, to
recognize implicit bias as a potential problem, which in turn should increase motivation to adopt sensible countermeasures. Did the NCSC projects increase
recognition of the problem and encourage the right sorts of behavioral changes? The
only evidence we have is limited: voluntary self-reports subject to obvious selection biases.
For example, in California, judicial training emphasized a documentary on the
neuroscience of bias. 226 Before and after watching the documentary, participants
were asked to what extent they thought "a judge's decisions and court staffs interaction with the public can be unwittingly influenced by unconscious bias toward
racial/ethnic groups."227 Before viewing the documentary, approximately 16 percent
chose "rarely-never," 55 percent chose "occasionally," and 30 percent chose "mostall." After viewing the documentary, 1 percent chose "rarely-never," 20 percent
chose "occasionally," and 79 percent chose "most-all."228
Relatedly, participants were asked whether they thought implicit bias could
have an impact on behavior even if a person lacked explicit bias. Before viewing
the documentary, approximately 9 percent chose "rarely-never," 45 percent chose
"occasionally," and 45 percent chose "most-all." After viewing the documentary,
1 percent chose "rarely-never," 14 percent chose "occasionally," and 84 percent

224. Several of the authors of this Article have spoken to judges on the topic of implicit bias.
225. See PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NATL CTR FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS
IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION (2012), available athttp://www.ncsc.org/IBReport.
226. The program was broadcast on the Judicial Branch's cable TV station and made available streaming
on the Internet. See The Neuroscience andPychology fDecisionmaking, ADIMIN. OFF. COURTS EDtC.
Div. (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www2.courtinfo.ca.gov/cjer/aoctv/dialogue/neuro/index.htm.
227. See CASEYETAL., supra note 225, at 12 fig.2.
228. See id.
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chose "most-all."2 29 These statistics provide some evidence that the California documentary increased awareness of the problem of implicit bias. The qualitative data,
in the form of write-in comments230 support this interpretation.
What about the adoption of behavioral countermeasures? Because no specific
reforms were recommended at the time of training, there was no attempt to measure behavioral changes. All that we have are self-reports that speak to the issue. For
instance, participants were asked to agree or disagree with the statement, "I will apply
the course content to my work." In California, 90 percent (N=60) reported that they
agreed or strongly agreed. 231 In North Dakota (N= 32), 97 percent reported that
they agreed or strongly agreed? 32 Three months later, there was a follow-up survey
given to the North Dakota participants, but only fourteen participants replied. In
that survey, 77 percent of those who responded stated that they had made
efforts to reduce the potential impact of implicit bias. 233 In sum, the findings across
all three pilot programs suggest that education programs can increase motivation
and encourage judges to engage in some behavioral modifications. Given the limitations of the data (for example, pilot projects with small numbers of participants, self-reports, self -selection, and limited follow-up results), additional research
is needed to confirm these promising but preliminary results.
From our collective experience, we also recommend the following tactics.
First, training should commence early, starting with new-judge orientation when
individuals are likely to be most receptive. Second, training should not immediately
put judges on the defensive, for instance, by accusing them of concealing explicit
bias. Instead, trainers can start the conversation with other types of decisionmaking
errors and cognitive biases, such as anchoring, or less-threatening biases, such
as the widespread preference for the youth over the elderly that IATs reveal.
Third, judges should be encouraged to take the IAT or other measures of implicit

229. Idatl12 fig.3.
230. Comments included: "raising my awareness of prevalence of implicit bias," "enlightened me on the
penetration of implicit bias in everyday life, even though I consciously strive to be unbiased and
assume most people try to do the same," and "greater awareness-I really appreciated the impressive
panel of participants; I really learned a lot, am very interested." See CASEY ET AL., supranote 225, at 11.
231. See id.at 10.
232. See id. at 18. Minnesota answered a slightly different question: 81 percent gave the program's
applicability a medium high to high rating.
233. See id. at 20. The strategies that were identified included: "concerted effort to be aware of bias," "I
more carefilly review my reasons for decisions, likes, dislikes, and ask myself if there may be bias
underlying my determination," "Simply trying to think things through more thoroughly,"
"Reading and learning more about other cultures," and "I have made mental notes to myself on the
bench to be more aware of the implicit bias and I've re-examined my feelings to see if it is because of
the party and his/her actions vs. any implicit bias on my part."
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bias. Numerous personal accounts have reported how the discomfiting act of
taking the IAT alone motivates action. And researchers are currently studying the
specific behavioral and social cognitive changes that take place through such selfdiscovery. That said, we do not recommend that such tests be mandatory because
the feeling of resentment and coercion is likely to counter the benefits of increased
self-knowledge. Moreover, judges should never be expected to disclose their
personal results.
c. Improve Conditions of Decisionmaking
Implicit biases function automatically. One way to counter them is to engage
in effortful, deliberative processing. 234 But when decisionmakers are short on time
or under cognitive load, they lack the resources necessary to engage in such deliberation. Accordingly, we encourage judges to take special care when they must
respond quickly and to try to avoid making snap judgments whenever possible. We
recognize that judges are under enormous pressures to clear ever-growing dockets.
That said, it is precisely under such work conditions that judges need to be especially
on guard against their biases.
There is also evidence that certain elevated emotional states, either positive
or negative, can prompt more biased decisionmaking. For example, a state of
happiness seems to increase stereotypic thinking,23 5which can be countered when
individuals are held accountable for their judgments. Of greater concern might be
feelings of anger, disgust, or resentment toward certain social categories. If the
emotion is consistent with the stereotypes or anticipated threats associated with that

social category, then those negative emotions are likely to exacerbate implicit biases. 236

234. There are also ways to deploy more automatic countermeasures. In other words, one can teach one's
mind to respond not reflectively but reflexively, by automatically triggering goal-directed behavior
through internalization of certain if-then responses. These countermeasures function implicitly and
even under conditions of cognitive load. See generally Saaid A. Mendoza et al., Reducing the Expression
flmplicit Stereotypes: Rtflexive ControlThrough Implementation Intentions, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 512, 514-15, 520 (2010); Monteith et al., supra note 221, at 218-21 (discussing
bottom-up correction versus top-down).
235. See Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Happines and Stereotypic Thinking in Social Judgment, 66 J.
PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 621 (1994).
236. See Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Fanning the Flames qf Prejudice: The Influence f Specific Incidental
Emotionson Implicit Prejudice, 9 EMOTION 585 (2009). The researchers found that implicit bias against
gays and lesbians could be increased more by making participants feel disgust than by making participants feel anger. See id. at 588. Conversely, they found that implicit bias against Arabs could be
increased more by making participants feel angry rather than disgusted. See id.at 589; see also David
DeSteno et at, Prejudice From Thin Air:
AEmotin
The Effect
on Automatic Intergroup Attitudes, 15
PSYCHOL. Scl. 319 (2004).
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In sum, judges should try to achieve the conditions of decisionmaking that allow
them to be mindful and deliberative and thus avoid huge emotional swings.
d. Count
Finally, we encourage judges and judicial institutions to count. Increasing
accountability has been shown to decrease the influence of bias and thus has frequently been offered as a mechanism for reducing bias. But, how can the behavior
of trial court judges be held accountable if biased decisionmaking is itself
difficult to detect? Ifjudges do not seek out the information that could help them
see their own potential biases, those biases become more difficult to correct. Just
as trying to lose or gain weight without a scale is challenging, judges should
engage in more quantified self-analysis and seek out and assess patterns of behavior
that cannot be recognized in single decisions. Judges need to count.
The comparison we want to draw is with professional umpires and referees.
Statistical analyses by behavioral economists have discovered various biases, including
ingroup racial biases, in the decisionmaking of professional sports judges. Joseph
Price and Justin Wolfers found racial ingroup biases in National Basketball
Association (NBA) referees' foul calling; 237 Christopher Parsons and colleagues
found ingroup racial bias in Major League Baseball (MLB) umpires' strike calling. 238
These discoveries were only possible because professional sports leagues count
performance, including referee performance, in a remarkably granular and comprehensive manner.
Although NBA referees and MLB umpires make more instantaneous calls
than judges, judges do regularly make quick judgments on motions, objections,
and the like. In these contexts, judges often cannot slow down. So, it makes sense

237. Joseph Price &Justin Wolfers, Racial DiscriminationAmong NBA Rgferees, 125 QJ. EcON. 1859,
1885 (2010) ("We find that players have up to 4% fewer fouls called against them and score up to
212% more points on nights in which their race matches that of the refereeing crew. Player statistics
that one might think are unaffected by referee behavior [for example, free throw shooting] are uncorrelated with referee race. The bias in foul-calling is large enough so that the probability of a team
winning is noticeably affected by the racial composition of the refereeing crew assigned to the game.").
238. Christopher A. Parsons et al., Stake Three: Discimination,Incentives, andEvaluation, 101 AM. ECON.
REV. 1410, 1433 (2011) ("Pitches are slightly more likely to be called strikes when the umpire shares
the race/ethnicity of the starting pitcher, an effect that is observable only when umpires' behavior is
not well monitored. The evidence also suggests that this bias has substantial effects on pitchers'
measured performance and games' outcomes. The link between the small and large effects arises,
at lrast in part, because pitchers alter their behavior in potentially discriminatory situations in ways that
ordinarily would disadvantage themselves (such as throwing pitches directly over the plate).").
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to count their performances in domains such as bail, probable cause, and
preliminary hearings.
We recognize that such counting may be difficult for individual judges who
lack both the quantitative training and the resources to track their own performance statistics. That said, even amateur, basic counting, with data collection methods never intended to make it into a peer-reviewed journal, might reveal surprising
outcomes. Of course, the most useful information will require an institutional
commitment to counting across multiple judges and will make use of appropriately sophisticated methodologies. The basic objective is to create a negative
feedback loop in which individual judges and the judiciary writ large are given
the corrective information necessary to know how they are doing and to be
motivated to make changes if they find evidence of biased performances. It may be
difficult to correct biases even when we do know about them, but it is virtually
impossible to correct them if they remain invisible.
2.

Jurors

a. Jury Selection and Composition
Individual screen. One obvious way to break the link between bias and
unfair decisions is to keep biased persons off the jury. Since everyone has implicit
biases of one sort or another, the more precise goal would be to screen out those
with excessively high biases that are relevant to the case at hand. This is, of course,
precisely one of the purposes of voir dire, although the interrogation process was
designed to ferret out concealed explicit bias, not implicit bias.
One might reasonably ask whether potential jurors should be individually screened for implicit bias via some instrument such as the IAT. But the leading
scientists in implicit social cognition recommend against using the test as an individually diagnostic measure. One reason is that although the IAT has enough testretest reliability to provide useful research information about human beings
generally, its reliability is sometimes below what we would like for individual
assessments.239 Moreover, real-word diagnosticity for individuals raises many more
issues than just test-retest reliability. Finally, those with implicit biases need not
239. The test-retest reliability between a person's IAT scores at two different times has been found to be
0.50. For further discussion, see Kang & Lane, supra note 2, at 477-78. Readers should understand
that "the TAT's properties approximately resemble those of sphygmomanometer blood pressure (BP)
measures that are used to assess hypertension." See Anthony G. Greenwald & N. Sriram, No Measure
Is Pefect, but Some Measures Can Be Quite Usfut Response to Two Commients on the BrifImplicit
Association Test, 57 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 238, 240 (2010).
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be regarded as incapable of breaking the causal chain from implicit bias to
judgment. Accordingly, we maintain this scientifically conservative approach and
recommend against using the IAT for individual juror selection. 24 0
Jury diversity. Consider what a White juror wrote to Judge Janet Bond Arterton
about jury deliberations during a civil rights complaint filed by Black plaintiffs:
During deliberations, matter-of-fact expressions of bigotry and broadbrush platitudes about "those people" rolled off the tongues of a vocal
majority as naturally and unabashedly as if they were discussing the
weather. Shocked and sickened, I sat silently, rationalizing to myself that
since I did agree with the product, there was nothing to be gained by
speaking out against the process (I now regret my inaction). Hadjust
one African-American been sitting in that room, the content of discussion
would have been quite different. And had the case been more balanced-

one that hinged on fine distinction or subtle nuances-a more diverse
jury might have made a material difference in the outcome.
I pass these thoughts onto you in the hope that the jury system can
some day be improved. 24'
This anecdote suggests that a second-best strategy to striking potential jurors with
high implicit bias is to increase the demographic diversity of jurieS242 to get a
broader distribution of biases, some of which might cancel each other out. This
is akin to a diversification strategy for an investment portfolio. Moreover, in a more
diverse jury, people's willingness to express explicit biases might be muted, and the
very existence of diversity might even affect the operation of implicit biases as well.
In support of this approach, Sam Sommers has confirmed that racial diversity
in the jury alters deliberations. In a mock jury experiment, he compared the deliberation content of all-White juries with that of racially diverse juries. 24 3 Racially
diverse juries processed information in a way that most judges and lawyers would
consider desirable: They had longer deliberations, greater focus on the actual evidence, greater discussion of missing evidence, fewer inaccurate statements, fewer

240. For legal commentary in agreement, see, for example, Anna Roberts, (Refonrming the Jury: Detection
andDisinfection fImplicitJurorBias,44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 856-57 (2012). Roberts suggests using
the IAT during orientation as an educational tool for jurors instead. Id. at 863-66.
241. Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the ImpartialJury, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (2008)
(quoting letter from anonymous juror) (emphasis added).
242. For a structural analysis of why juries lack racial diversity, see Samuel R. Sommers, Determinants and
Consequences fJury RacialDiversity: EmpiricalFindings,Implications, andDirectiownfor Future Research,

2 Soc. ISSUES &POL'Y REV. 65, 68-71(2008).
243. The juries labeled "diverse" featured four White and two Black jurors.
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uncorrected statements, and greater discussion of race-related topics.244 In addition to these information-based benefits, Sommers found interesting
predeliberation effects: Simply by knowing that they would be serving on diverse
juries (as compared to all-White ones), White jurors were less likely to believe, at
the conclusion of evidence but before deliberations, that the Black defendant
was guilty.245
Given these benefits,2 4 6 we are skeptical about peremptory challenges, which
private parties deploy to decrease racial diversity in precisely those cases in
which diversity is likely to matter most. 24 7 Accordingly, we agree with the recommendation by various commentators, including Judge Mark Bennett, to curtail
substantially the use of peremptory challenges. 24 8 In addition, we encourage consid
eration of restoring a 12-member jury size as "the most effective approach" to
maintain juror representativeness. 249
b. Jury Education About Implicit Bias
In our discussion of judge bias, we recommended that judges become skeptical of their own objectivity and learn about implicit social cognition to become
motivated to check against implicit bias. The same principle applies to jurors, who
must be educated and instructed to do the same in the course of their jury
service. This education should take place early and often. For example, Judge

244. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identzfying Mutfle Effects of
Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations,90 J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006).
245. See Sommers, supra note 242, at 87.
246. Other benefits include promoting public confidence in the judicial system. See id at 82-88 (summarizing
theoretical and empirical literature).
247. See Michael I. Norton, Samuel R. Sommers & Sara Brauner, Bias in jury Selection: Justifying
Prohibited Peremptory Challenges, 20 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 467 (2007); Samuel R.
Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race andJury Selection: PsychologicalPerspectives on the Peremptory
ChallengeDebate, 63 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 527 (2008) (reviewing literature); Samuel R. Sommers &
Michael I. Norton, Race-BasedJudgments, Race-NeutralJustfications: Experimental Examination of
Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAw &Hum. BEHAV. 261 (2007) (finding
that race influences the exercise of peremptory challenges in participant populations that include
college students, law students, and practicing attorneys and that participants effectively justified their
use of challenges in race-neutral terms).
248. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 85, at 168-69 (recommending the tandem solution of increased lawyer
participation in voir dire and the banning of peremptory challenges); Antony Page, Batson's BlindSpot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005).
249. Shari Seid7man Diamond etal., AchievingDiversity on thefury:Jury Size andthe Peremptory Challenge,
6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL SrTUD. 425, 427 (2009).
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Bennett spends approximately twenty-five minutes discussing implicit bias during

jury

250

selection.
At the conclusion of jury selection, Judge Bennett asks each potential juror
to take a pledge, which covers various matters including a pledge against bias:
I pledge
I will not decide this case based on biases. This includes gut
feelings, prejudices, stereotypes, personal likes or dislikes, sympathies
or generalizations.251
He also gives a specific jury instruction on implicit biases before opening
statements:
Do not decide the case based on "implicit biases." As we discussed in
jury selection, everyone, including me, has feelings, assumptions, perceptions, fears, and stereotypes, that is, "implicit biases," that we may not
be aware of. These hidden thoughts can impact what we see and hear,
how we remember what we see and hear, and how we make important
decisions. Because you are making very important decisions in this case, I
strongly encourage you to evaluate the evidence carefully and to resist
jumping to conclusions based on personal likes or dislikes, generalizations, gut feelings, prejudices, sympathies, stereotypes, or biases. The law
demands that you return a just verdict, based solely on the evidence,
your individual evaluation of that evidence, your reason and common

250. Judge Bennett starts with a clip from What Would You Do?, an ABC show that uses hidden cameras
to capture bystanders' reactions to a variety of staged situations. This episode-a brilliant demonstration
of bias-opens with a bike chained to a pole near a popular bike trail on a sunny afternoon. First, a
young White man, dressed in jeans, a t-shirt, and a baseball cap, approaches the bike with a
hammer and saw and begins working on the chain (and even gets to the point of pulling out an

industrial-strength bolt cutter). Many people pass by without saying anything; one asks him if he
lost the key to his bike lock. Although many others show concern, they do not interfere. After those
passersby dear, the show stages its next scenario: a young Black man, dressed the same way,
approaches the bike with the same tools and attempts to break the chain. Within seconds, people confront
him, wanting to knowwhether the bike is his. Quickly, a crowd congregates, with people shouting at him
that he cannot take what does not belong to him and some even calling the police. Finally, after the
crowd moves on, the show stages its last scenario: a young White woman, attractive and scantily clad,
approaches the bike with the same tools and attempts to saw through the chain. Several men ride
up and ask if they can help her break the locl Potential jurors immediately see how implicit biases
can affect what they see and hear. What Would You Do? (ABC television broadcast May 7, 2010),
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch.v=ge7i6OGuNRg.
251. Mark W. Bennett, Jury Pledge Against Implicit Bias (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors). In addition, Judge Bennett has a framed poster prominently displayed in the jury room that
repeats the language in the pledge.
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sense, and these instructions. Our system ofjustice is counting on you
to render a fair decision based on the evidence, not on biases. 252
Juror research suggests that jurors respond differently to instructions
depending on the persuasiveness of each instruction's rationale. For example, jurors
seem to comply more with an instruction to ignore inadmissible evidence when
the reason for inadmissibility is potential unreliability, not procedural irregularity.253 Accordingly, the implicit bias instructions to jurors should be couched in
accurate, evidence-based, and scientific terms. As with the judges, the juror's
education and instruction should not put them on the defensive, which might
make them less receptive. Notice how Judge Bennett's instruction emphasizes the
near universality of implicit biases, including in the judge himself, which decreases
the likelihood of insult, resentment, or backlash from the jurors.
To date, no empirical investigation has tested a system like Judge
Bennett's-although we believe there are good reasons to hypothesize about its
benefits. For instance, Regina Schuller, Veronica Kazoleas, and Kerry Kawakami
demonstrated that a particular type of reflective voir dire, which required individuals to answer an open-ended question about the possibility of racial bias,

252. Id. In all criminal cases, Judge Bennett also instructs on explicit biases using an instruction that is
borrowed from a statutory requirement in federal death penalty cases:
You must follow certain rules while conducting your deliberations and returning
your verdict:
Reach your verdict without discrimination. In reaching your verdict, you must not
consider the defendant's race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex. You are
not to return a verdict for or against the defendant unless you would return the same
verdict without regard to his race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex. To
emphasize the importance of this requirement, the verdict form contains a certification statement. Each of you should carefully read that statement, then sign your
name in the appropriate place in the signature block, if the statement accurately reflects

how you reached your verdict.
The certification statement, contained in a final section labeled "Certification" on the Verdict
Form, states the following:
By signing below, each juror certifies that consideration of the race, color, religious
beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant was not involved in reaching his or her
individual decision, and that the individual juror would have returned the same
verdict for or against the defendant on the charged offense regardless of the race, color,
religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant.
This certification is also shown to all potential jurors injury selection, and each is asked ifthey will
be able to sign it.
253. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R. Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard and
theJury- Substantive Versus ProceduralConsiderations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1046 (1997) (finding evidence that mock jurors responded diferently to wiretap evidence that was ruled
inadmissible either because it was illegally obtained or unreliable).
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appeared successful at removing juror racial bias in assessments of guilt.254 That
said, no experiment has yet been done on whether jury instructions specifically
targeted at implicit bias are effective in real-world settings. Research on this specific question is in development.
We also recognize the possibility that such instructions could lead to juror
complacency or moral credentialing, in which jurors believe themselves to be properly immunized or educated about bias and thus think themselves to be more objecfive than they really are. And, as we have learned, believing oneself to be objective
is a prime threat to objectivity. Despite these limitations, we believe that implicit
bias education and instruction of the jury is likely to do more good than harm,
though we look forward to further research that can help us assess this hypothesis.
c. Encourage Category-Conscious Strategies
Foregroundsocial categories. Many jurors reasonably believe that in order to
be fair, they should be as colorblind (or gender-blind, and so forth.) as possible.
In other words, they should try to avoid seeing race, thinking about race, or
talking about race whenever possible. But the juror research by Sam Sommers
demonstrated that White jurors showed race bias in adjudicating the merits of a
battery case (between White and Black people) unless they perceived the case to
be somehow racially charged. In other words, until and unless White jurors felt
there was a specific threat to racial fairness, they showed racial bias. 55
What this seems to suggest is that whenever a social category bias might be
at issue, judges should recommend that jurors feel free to expressly raise and
foreground any such biases in their discussions. Instead of thinking it appropriate
to repress race, gender, or sexual orientation as irrelevant to understanding the
case, judges should make jurors comfortable with the legitimacy of raising such
issues. This may produce greater confrontation among the jurors within deliberation,
and evidence suggests that it is precisely this greater degree of discussion, and even
confrontation, that can potentially decrease the amount of biased decisionmaking. 256
This recommendation-to be conscious of race, gender, and other social
categories-may seem to contradict some of the jury instructions that we noted

254. Regina A. Schuller, Veronica Kazoleas & Kery Kawakami, The Impact ofPrejudice ScreeningProcedures
on RacialBias in the Courtroom, 33 LAW & HviM. BEHAV. 320 (2009).
255. See supra notes 70-71.
256. See
Alexander M. Czopp,MargoJ. Monteith &AimeeY. Mark, Standing Upfora Change:Reducing
Bias Through Interpersonal Confrontation, 90 J. PE RSON ALITY &Soc. PSYCH OL. 78 4, 791 (2006).
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above approvingly. 257 But a command that the race (and other social categories)
of the defendant should not influence the juror's verdict is entirely consistent with
instructions to recognize explicitly that race can have just this impact-unless
countermeasures are taken. In other words, in order to make jurors behave in a
colorblind manner, we can explicitly foreground the possibility of racial bias. 258
Engage in perspective shifting. Another strategy is to recommend that jurors
try shifting perspectives into the position of the outgroup party, either plaintiff
or defendant. 259 Andrew Todd, Galen Bohenhausen, Jennifer Richardson, and
Adam Galinsky have recently demonstrated that actively contemplating others'
psychological experiences weakens the automatic expression of racial biases.260 In
a series of experiments, the researchers used various interventions to make participants engage in more perspective shifting. For instance, in one experiment, before
seeing a five-minute video of a Black man being treated worse than an identically
situated White man, participants were asked to imagine "what they might be
thinking, feeling, and experiencing if they were Glen [the Black man], looking
at the world through his eyes and walking in his shoes as he goes through the
various activities depicted in the documentary.1"261 By contrast, the control group
was told to remain objective and emotionally detached. In other variations, perspective taking was triggered by requiring participants to write an essay imagining a
day in the life of a young Black male.
These perspective-taking interventions substantially decreased implicit bias in
the form of negative attitudes, as measured by both a variant of the standard
IAT (the personalized IAT) and the standard race attitude IAT.262 More impor
tant, these changes in implicit bias, as measured by reaction time instruments,

257. See Bennett, supra note 252 ("[Y]ou must not consider the defendant's race, color, religious beliefs,
national origin, or sex. You are not to return a verdict for or against the defendant unless you would
return the same verdict without regard to his race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex.").

258. Although said in a different context, Justice Blackmun's insight seems appropriate here: "In order to
get beyond racism we must first take account of race." Regents ofthe Univ. f Cal v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
259. For a thoughtful discussion ofjury instructions on "gender-, race-, and/or sexual orientation-switching,"
see CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 252-55 (2003); see abAo id. at 257-58 (quoting actual race-switching
instruction given in a criminal trial based on Prof Lee's work).
260. Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1027 (2011).
261. See id. at 1030.
262. Experiment one involved the five-minute video. Those in the perspective-shifting condition showed
a bias of M=0.43, whereas those in the control showed a bias of M=0.80. Experiment two involved
the essay,
inwhich participants
inthe perspective-taking condition showed M=0.01 versus M=0.49.
See id. at1031. Experiment three used the standard IAT. See idt.at1033.
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also correlated with behavioral changes. For example, the researchers found that
those in the perspective-taking condition chose to sit closer to a Black
interviewer, 263 and physical closeness has long been understood as positive body
language, which is reciprocated. Moreover, Black experimenters rated their
interaction with White participants who were put in the perspective-taking
condition more positively. 4
CONCLUSION
Most of us would like to be free of biases, attitudes, and stereotypes that lead
us to judge individuals based on the social categories they belong to, such as race
and gender. But wishing things does not make them so. And the best scientific evidence suggests that we-all of us, no matter how hard we try to be fair and square,
no matter how deeply we believe in our own objectivity-have implicit mental
associations that will, in some circumstances, alter our behavior. They manifest
everywhere, even in the hallowed courtroom. Indeed, one of our key points here is
not to single out the courtroom as a place where bias especially reigns but rather to
suggest that there is no evidence for courtroom exceptionalism. There is simply
no legitimate basis for believing that these pervasive implicit biases somehow stop
operating in the halls of justice.
Confronted with a robust research basis suggesting the widespread effects of
bias on decisionmaking, we are therefore forced to choose. Should we seek to be
behaviorally realistic, recognize our all-too-human frailties, and design procedures
and systems to decrease the impact of bias in the courtroom? Or should we
ignore inconvenient facts, stick our heads in the sand, and hope they somehow go
away? Even with imperfect information and tentative understandings, we choose
the first option. We recognize that our suggestions are starting points, that they
may not all work, and that, even as a whole, they may not be sufficient. But we
do think they are worth a try. We hope that judges and other stakeholders in the
justice system agree.

263. See idat 1035.
264. See id.at 1037.

HeinOnline -- 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1186 2011-2012

HeinOnline -- 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1187 2011-2012

